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Abstract
We present Cobalt, a novel atomic broadcast algorithm that works in
networks with non-uniform trust and no global agreement on participants,
and is probabilistically guaranteed to make forward progress even in the
presence of maximal faults and arbitrary asynchrony. The exact proper-
ties that Cobalt satisfies makes it particularly applicable to designing an
efficient decentralized “voting network” that allows a public, open-entry
group of nodes to agree on changes to some shared set of rules in a fair
and consistent manner while tolerating some trusted nodes and arbitrarily
many untrusted nodes behaving maliciously. We also define a new set of
properties which must be satisfied by any safe decentralized governance
algorithm, and all of which Cobalt satisfies.
1 Introduction
With the recent explosion in popularity of decentralized digital currencies, it is
becoming more imperative than ever to have algorithms that are fast, efficient,
easy to run, and quantifiably safe. These digital currencies typically rely on
some “consensus” mechanism to ensure that everyone has a consistent record of
which transactions occurred, to prevent malicious actors from sending the same
money to two different honest actors (referred to as “double spending”). More
traditional digital currencies that rely on proof-of-work consensus [23], such
as Bitcoin and Ethereum, struggle to obtain low transaction times and high
throughput, with theoretical results showing that proper scaling is impossible
without fundamental changes to these protocols [14]. Meanwhile, XRP has since
its inception been both relatively fast and scalable [27]. Rejecting such proof-
of-work algorithms, XRP uses a consensus algorithm in the sense of research
literature [24], where a group of nodes collaborates to agree on an ordering
of transactions in the face of arbitrary asynchrony and some tolerated number
of arbitrarily behaving parties. It has long been known that such consensus
protocols can be made very efficient [11].
For XRP the concern is thus less about how to improve the efficiency of the
protocol, and more about how to enable easy “decentralization”. Traditional
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consensus algorithms assume a complete network where all nodes agree on who
is participating in consensus. However, in a real scenario where a consensus net-
work is run by actually independent parties with their own beliefs, regulations,
and motivations, it would be effectively impossible to guarantee that everyone
agrees on the same network participants. Further, trying to make such a system
amenable to open participation would immediately open the door to a Sybil at-
tack [15] wherein a single entity gains control of a substantial fraction of the
network and wreaks havoc. Thus these classical consensus algorithms are a poor
choice for use in a decentralized network.
The XRP Ledger Consensus Protocol (XRP LCP) resolves this issue by al-
lowing partial disagreement on the participants in the network while still guar-
anteeing that all nodes come to agreement on the ledger state. The set of partic-
ipants that a node considers in the network is referred to as that node’s unique
node list or UNL. In this setting the consistency of the network state is guar-
anteed by an overlap formula that prescribes a lower bound for the intersection
of any two correct nodes’ UNLs. As described in the original whitepaper [24],
this lower bound was originally thought to be roughly 20% of the UNL size. An
independent response paper [3] later suggested that the true bound was roughly
> 40% of the UNL size. Unfortunately, both of these bounds turned out to be
naive, and in a sister paper to this paper [12] Chase and MacBrough prove that
the correct bound is actually roughly > 90%. Although this bound allows some
variation, we would prefer a bound somewhat closer to the original expectation,
to allow as much flexibility as possible. Chase and MacBrough also show that
when there is not universal agreement on the participants, it is possible for the
network to get “stuck” even with 99% UNL agreement and no faulty nodes, so
that no forward progress can ever be made without manual intervention.
To solve these issues, this paper proposes a new consensus protocol called
Cobalt, which can be used to power decentralized digital currencies such as
XRP. Cobalt reduces the overlap bound to only > 60%, which gives much more
flexibility to support painless decentralization without the fear of coming to an
inconsistent ledger state. Further, unlike the previous algorithm, Cobalt cannot
get stuck when the overlap bound is satisfied between every pair of honest nodes.
Another advantageous property of Cobalt is that the overlap condition for
consistency is local. This means two nodes that have sufficient overlap with
each other cannot arrive at inconsistent ledger states, regardless of the overlaps
between other pairs of nodes. This property makes it much easier to analyze
whether the network is in a safe condition. For a network that can potentially be
(mis-)configured by humans, it is very important to be able to easily recognize
when the network unsafe.
Further, Cobalt always makes forward progress fully asynchronously. Similar
to the well-known consensus algorithm PBFT [11], the previous algorithm, XRP
LCP, required assuming a form of “weak asynchrony” where throughput could
be dropped to 0 by slightly-higher-than-expected delays or a few faulty nodes.
But in practice, it is difficult to quantify what level of delay is “expected” in a
decentralized open setting, where nodes can be in arbitrary locations around the
globe and have arbitrarily poor communication speed. With Cobalt however,
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performance simply degrades smoothly as the average message delay increases,
even with the maximal number of tolerated faulty nodes and an actively adver-
sarial network scheduler. In a live network, breaking forward progress could do
a lot of damage to businesses that rely on being able to execute transactions on
time, so this extra property is very valuable.
Decentralization is important primarily for two reasons: first, it gives redun-
dancy, which protects against individual node failures and gives much higher
uptime; second, it gives adaptability, so that even in the face of changing hu-
man legislation, the network can conform to those changes without needing a
trusted third party that can exert singular control over the network. One of
the core insights of Cobalt is that these two properties of decentralization can
be separated to give better efficiency while maintaining redundancy and adapt-
ability. Like many other decentralized consensus mechanisms, Cobalt performs
relatively slowly when used as a consensus mechanism for validating transac-
tions directly. Thus instead of using Cobalt for transactions directly, we only
use it for proposing changes to the system (“amendments” in the XRP Ledger
terminology). Meanwhile a separate network with universal agreement on its
participants can run a faster consensus mechanism to agree on a total ordering
for the transactions. Changes to the members of this “transaction network” are
executed as amendments through Cobalt. In this setup, the transaction network
running a fast consensus algorithm gives both speed and redundancy, while the
governance layer running Cobalt gives adaptability.
Using Cobalt together with a fast, robust transaction processing algorithm
like Aardvark [13] or Honeybadger [21] gives all the same benefits of full decen-
tralization while vastly improving the optimal efficiency. Further, in appendix A
we present a simple protocol addition that enables the security requirements of
the transaction processing algorithm to be reduced to the security requirements
of Cobalt; thus even if every single transaction processing node fails, as long as
the consistency requirements of Cobalt are met then every node will continue to
agree on the ledger state. Other ideas for using using a decentralized algorithm
to delegate a consensus group such as dBFT [1] do not share this property, and
instead require additional assumptions about the delegated group to guaran-
tee consistency, weakening the system’s overall security. The proposed addition
adds only a slight latency overhead to the transaction processing algorithm.
We stress that this does not reduce the benefits of decentralization, as the
transaction processing nodes only have the role of ordering transactions. Cobalt
nodes still validate transactions on their own, are guaranteed to still accept the
same transactions, and since client transactions are broadcast over the peer-to-
peer network, the transaction processing nodes cannot even censor transactions
since the Cobalt nodes could identify this behavior and eventually elect a new
group of transaction processing nodes that don’t censor transactions. Delegating
the job of ordering transactions to a dedicated group is purely an optimization,
and does not harm the robustness of the network in any way.
In section 2 we describe our network model and the problem we’re trying
to solve. In section 3 we summarize the existing results in the area and justify
the need for a new protocol. In section 4 we present the details of the Cobalt
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algorithm and prove that it satisfies all the properties we require of it. In
appendix A we describe an extension that can be used to reduce the security
requirements of other consensus algorithms to Cobalt’s security requirements,
and in appendix C we include an extra proposition which shows that Cobalt is
actually reasonably efficient, but which doesn’t fit into the flow of the rest of
the paper.
2 Network Model and Problem Definition
Let P be the set of all nodes in the network. An individual node in P is
referred to as Pi, where i is some unique identifier, such as a cryptographic
public key. We do not assume all parties (or any party) know the identities of
every node in P , nor even the size of P . We assume that every pair of nodes
has a reliable authenticated communication channel between them. This can be
implemented in a reasonable way by using a peer-to-peer overlay network and
cryptographically signing messages. Clearly, nodes cannot be made to respond
to requests from arbitrary parties, since this immediately opens up an avenue
for distributed denial of service attacks [28]. We assume however that any
node has some way of making requests of any every other node if it is willing
to “put in some effort”. For instance, nodes might charge a modest fee or
require some proof-of-work to respond to a request from an untrusted node.
This makes DDOSing the network infeasible while allowing untrusted nodes to
make requests of other nodes.
A node that is not crashed and behaves exactly according to the protocol
defined in section 4 is said to be correct. Any node that is not correct is
Byzantine. Byzantine behavior can include not responding to messages, send-
ing incorrect messages, and even sending different messages to different par-
ties. Note that in the original analysis of XRP LCP [24], it was assumed that
Byzantine nodes cannot send different messages to different nodes, since it was
implicitly assumed that in a peer-to-peer network such behavior would be eas-
ily identifiable. However, in our subsequent re-analysis [12] we dispensed with
this assumption, since a network partition could potentially allow irreversible
damage to be done before such behavior is correctly identified. Not making this
assumption is canonical in the research literature on consensus algorithms [18],
so we do not make it here either.
We further make the following nonstandard definition: a node is actively
Byzantine if it sends some message to another node that it would not have sent
had it been correct. A node can be Byzantine without being actively Byzantine;
for example, a node that crashes is Byzantine but not actively Byzantine. A
node which is not actively Byzantine is honest.
Every node Pi has a unique node list or UNL, denoted UNLi. A node’s
UNL is thought of as the set of nodes that it partially trusts and listens to
for making decisions. UNLi may or may not include Pi itself. The UNLs give
structure to the network and allow a layered notion of trust, where a node that
is present in more UNLs is implicitly considered more trustworthy and is more
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influential. We sometimes say that Pj listens to Pi if Pi ∈ UNLj .
For most of the Cobalt protocol, we further assume that every honest node
only has a single communication function, called broadcast. The statement
that “Pi broadcasts the message M” means Pi sends M to every node that
listens to Pi. While not strictly necessary, this assumption makes the proto-
col analysis slightly simpler and is powerful enough on its own to develop the
Cobalt protocol. The only exception to this rule is in section 4.1 for distributing
threshold shares, which requires sending different messages to different nodes.
We also require that if an honest node broadcasts Pi a messageM , then even
if Pi crashes or otherwise behaves incorrectly in any way, it eventually sends
M to every node that listens to it, or else no node receives M from Pi. This
is reasonable from an implementation standpoint if messages are routed over a
peer-to-peer network: as long as a node doesn’t send contradictory messages, a
message sent to one party should eventually be received by all listening parties.
We note that this requirement is needed only for guaranteeing liveness, not
consistency.
We define the extended UNL UNL∞i to be the “closure” of Pi’s UNL,
which recursively contains the set of nodes in the UNL of any honest node in
UNL
∞
i . Formally, this is defined inductively by defining UNL
1
i = UNLi and
then defining UNLni to be the set of all nodes in the UNL of any honest node
in UNLn−1i . We then define the extended UNL of Pi to be the set UNL
∞
i =⋃
n∈N UNL
n
i . Intuitively, a node’s extended UNL represents the entire network
from the perspective of Pi; any node that could possibly have an effect on Pi
either directly or indirectly is in UNL∞i .
A node Pi also maintains a set of essential subsets, denoted ESi, where
UNLi =
⋃
E∈ESi
E. Intuitively, whereas a node’s UNL is the set of all nodes
that it listens to for making decisions, its essential subsets refine how it makes
decisions based on the messages it receives from those nodes. The original XRP
Ledger consensus algorithm had no notion of essential subsets, and instead used
a predefined “quorum” qi defining how many nodes in UNLi Pi needs to hear
from to make a decision. The direct analogue of this model would loosely be to
let ESi be the set of all subsets of UNLi of size at least 3(ni− qi) + 1. It follows
immediately from proposition 25 that using this model with 80% quorums as
suggested in the XRP whitepaper, Cobalt guarantees consistency for all nodes
with roughly > 60% pairwise UNL overlaps.
Despite the fact that the original UNL formalism can be transferred to the
essential subset model, in our model we consider the essential subsets as central
and the UNL as more or less incidental. We expect a node’s UNL to typically
be derived automatically from its essential subsets rather than the other way
around, and it is used only for bookkeeping and making some results about the
algorithm easier to express.
If S ∈ ESi for some node Pi, we define nS = |S| and define two additional
parameters, tS and qS . These latter two parameters must always satisfy the
following inequalities:
0 6 tS , qS 6 nS (1)
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tS < 2qS − nS . (2)
2tS < qS . (3)
Effectively, tS represents the maximum allowed number of actively Byzantine
nodes in S required for guaranteeing safety while qS represents the number of
correct nodes in S required for guaranteeing liveness. qS and tS can be specified
by node operators individually for each S as a configuration parameter; however,
if two essential subsets contain the same nodes but different values of tS or qS ,
we consider them to be distinct essential subsets. Equation 1 is just parameter
sanity; equation 2 enforces that unless more than tS nodes in S are actively
Byzantine, then any two subsets of qS nodes must intersect in some honest node,
which is used to guarantee consistency; without equation 3, forward progress
cannot be guaranteed to hold for any node listening to S even when every single
node is correct. Note that if nS > 3tS + 1 and qS = nS − tS , then all of these
inequalities hold.
We make no implicit assumptions about the actual number of faulty nodes
in any given essential subset S, nor about the total number of faulty nodes
in the network. Nor do we implicitly assume any common structure to the
arrangement of the essential subsets between nodes. Instead, we will explicitly
show which assumptions about the allowed Byzantine nodes and the allowed
essential subset configurations are needed to guarantee each result. Doing this is
useful because it turns out that certain properties like consistency require much
weaker assumptions than other properties like liveness. In particular, we will
show that consistency is actually a “local” property, which makes it very easy
to analyze when consistency holds, and if the stronger assumptions required for
liveness are ever violated, the network can at least eventually reconfigure itself
to a new live configuration without having ever become inconsistent.
We call the problem we would like to solve democratic atomic broad-
cast, or DABC. DABC formalizes exactly the properties that are needed to
implement a decentralized “governance layer” that can be used to agree in a
fair and safe way on a set of protocol rules that evolves over time.
Formally, a protocol that solves DABC allows an arbitrary (but finite) num-
ber of proposers – whose identities may be unknown in advance or not uni-
versally agreed upon, and an arbitrary number of which can be Byzantine –
to broadcast amendments to the network. Each node can choose to either
support or oppose each amendment it receives, and then each node over time
ratifies some of those amendments and assigns each ratified amendment an
activation time, according to the following properties:
• DABC-Agreement: If any correct node ratifies an amendment A and as-
signs it the activation time τ , then eventually every other correct node
also ratifies A and assigns it the activation time τ .
• DABC-Linearizability: If any correct node ratifies an amendment A before
ratifying some other amendment A′, then every other correct node ratifies
A before A′.
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• DABC-Democracy: If any correct node ratifies an amendment A, then for
every correct node Pi there exists some essential subset S ∈ ESi such that
the majority of all honest nodes in S supported A, and further supported
A being ratified in the context of all the amendments ratified before A.
• DABC-Liveness: If all correct nodes support some unratified amendment
A, then eventually some new amendment will be ratified.
• DABC-Full-Knowledge: For every time τ , a correct node can run a “wait-
ing protocol” which always terminates in a finite amount of time, and
afterwards know every amendment that will ever be ratified with an acti-
vation time before τ .
We will expand on these properties in section 4.4.1 with the appropriate
network conditions required for each individual property to hold. Although
Agreement and Linearizability are clear and familiar from traditional atomic
broadcast definitions, some explanation may be needed for the remaining three
properties.
Democracy formalizes the idea that any amendment should be supported by
a reasonable portion of the network. One might hope that Democracy could be
strengthened to require that the majority of correct nodes in all of Pi’s essential
subsets must have supported A. Unfortunately, since we don’t assume universal
agreement on participants, it might not be possible for a node to wait until it
knows that every essential subset of every correct node has sufficient support
for A, since there might be essential subsets that the node doesn’t know about.
The Democracy condition we do use seems like a reasonable compromise, and
additionally it implicitly weights a node’s voting power by the number of nodes
that trust it. For example, if some essential subset is maintained by every
single node then that subset alone could potentially pass amendments, whereas
a subset only maintained by a few nodes would need to work together with other
subsets to pass amendments. The stronger Democracy property does hold in
complete networks.
Most atomic broadcast algorithms use a “Validity” or “Censorship Re-
silience” property in place of Liveness that ensures a correct proposer (or client
in usual terminology) will eventually have its amendment (transaction) ratified
(accepted). Unfortunately, this doesn’t work in our case since not every pro-
poser may be able to broadcast its transaction to the entire network, and further
an amendment might become invalid if a contradictory amendment is ratified
before it. The latter issue could be solved by removing invalidated amendments
post-facto, but doing so would be unnecessarily inefficient with our protocol.
Instead we use Liveness, which is equivalent to these stronger properties as long
as the proposer can broadcast A throughout the network and no amendments
which contradict A are ratified first.
For plain transaction processing, Agreement and Linearizability are the only
properties needed by an atomic broadcast algorithm to guarantee consistency.
Amendment processing adds a further layer of complexity though: nodes need
to start acting according to the specifications of a ratified amendment at some
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point. Very subtle and difficult to detect bugs could surface if two nodes are
running different versions of a protocol due to asynchronous knowledge of the set
of ratified amendments. We rectify this issue by guaranteeing Full Knowledge,
which gives nodes a way to always synchronize their active amendments. Note
though that for a globally distributed network, synchronized clocks can’t be
assumed to exist, so each protocol built on top of a Cobalt network should first
run consensus to agree on a starting time. Then every Cobalt node can agree
on exactly which version of the protocol to run. This is done for example in the
XRP Ledger, by agreeing on a “ledger close time” for each block, which can be
used as a starting time for the consensus protocol that agrees on the next block.
To model correctness of the algorithm, we consider a network adversary
that is allowed to behave arbitrarily. The network adversary controls delivery of
all messages as well as all Byzantine nodes. The only restrictions we make on the
adversary is that it cannot break commonly accepted cryptographic protocols
and eventually delivers every message sent between correct parties.
Due to the FLP result [16], a consensus algorithm (and in particular a DABC
algorithm, which is a special type of consensus) cannot be guaranteed to make
forward progress in the presence of arbitrary asynchrony. Thus the established
convention is to ensure that consistency holds even in the presence of arbitrary
asynchrony, but weaken the liveness property somehow. Two common variants
are to assume liveness only holds during periods with stronger synchrony re-
quirements [11] [13], or to only make liveness hold eventually with probability
1 [5] [6] [8] [21].
The former technique seems unsuitable for a wide-area network whose suc-
cess is critical. Regardless of the heuristic likelihood of an attack breaking
liveness for an extended period of time, it would be best to be mathematically
confident that such an attack is infeasible. Thus we opt for the latter option for
Cobalt. Although older randomness-based consensus protocols use local random
values to guarantee termination, these protocols are highly inefficient in prac-
tice, requiring either exponential expected time to terminate, or asymptotically
fewer tolerated faults. Newer protocols starting with [8] typically use a “cryp-
tographic common coin” that uses threshold signatures to generate a common
random seed that cannot be predicted in advance by a computationally bounded
adversary. Cryptographic common coins are very efficient, but do not immedi-
ately extend to the open network model, where the notion of a “threshold” is
undefined. We thus begin section 4.1 with defining and implementing a suitable
adaptation to our model which is almost as efficient and suitably powerful to
develop Cobalt.
3 Other Work
In complete networks where all nodes trust each other equally, there has been
much research on Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithms, both weakly
asynchronous ones and fully asynchronous ones. Notable examples include
PBFT [11], SINTRA [8], Aardvark [13], and more recently Honeybadger [21].
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Most of these algorithms can be made democratic using a similar democratic
modification of reliable broadcast as the one presented in section 4.2.2.
PBFT and Aardvark are both very fast and seem to have basic adaptations to
our model, although the view change protocol requires some modification since
the cryptography it uses is not fully expressive in our model (for an idea of how
these changes might look, see appendix A where we develop a ”view change”
protocol that works in our model). However, leader-based algorithms like PBFT
and Aardvark require agreement on a set of possible leaders, and if all of these
leaders were to fail at once there would obviously be no way to guarantee forward
progress, so these algorithms require stronger network assumptions than Cobalt.
Additionally, neither of these protocols is guaranteed to make forward progress
fully asynchronously, which makes them satisfy weaker properties than Cobalt.
The protocol extension presented in appendix A though is loosely modeled after
a simplified form of PBFT; to avoid the previously mentioned issue of needing
an extra security assumption, we use Cobalt to agree on the set of possible
leaders so that even if every leader fails at once eventually Cobalt can find new
leaders to suggest transactions.
Meanwhile, adapting asynchronous leaderless algorithms like SINTRA and
Honeybadger presents another difficulty in our model since we can’t assume
any specific number of honest nodes are capable of reliably broadcasting, so
the reduction to asynchronous common subset used in these algorithms doesn’t
work. Adapting SINTRA seems especially difficult because of its significant use
of threshold cryptography, for which it’s not clear what an adaptation to the
open model would even look like.
Alchieri et al. [2] designed an early attempt to weaken the complete-network
restrictions of classical algorithms, resulting in a Byzantine consensus algorithm
that works when not all nodes know the identities of all the participants. How-
ever, in their model every node is still trusted equally, so trying to use their
algorithm in an open network would immediately allow for a single entity to
gain unreasonable control over the network, commonly known as a Sybil attack
[15].
Schwartz et al. developed an algorithm that works in a similar model to
ours [24]. It guarantees safety based on “overlap conditions” that require that
every pair of nodes trust enough nodes in common. Unfortunately, Chase and
MacBrough later showed that the real safety condition is much tighter than
originally thought, and further the algorithm can get stuck in certain networks
where two UNLs disagree only by a single node [12]. Further, safety is a global
condition: if two nodes have sufficient overlap with each other but some other
nodes don’t have sufficient overlaps, then those two nodes might end up in
inconsistent states anyway. This is problematic both from a usability perspective
(checking safety requires checking n2 overlaps rather than n overlaps) and from
a pragmatic perspective (my safety should not depend on the bad decisions of
other nodes). Schwartz’s protocol is also only weakly asynchronous, and is also
not “robust” in the sense that a small number of Byzantine nodes can prevent
the protocol from ever terminating. In a live network where businesses depend
on forward progress, this could be a serious problem.
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More recently, Mazie`res described a novel protocol for solving consensus in
incomplete networks [20]. Mazie`res uses a network model which is similar to
ours1 and enables very loosely-coupled network topologies to remain consistent
by utilizing trust-transitivity to dynamically expand the set of nodes listened
to for making decisions.
However, the concrete condition for safety is again a global condition, and
seems very difficult to analyze in practice. Although the author provides a way
to decide if a given Byzantine fault configuration is safe for a given topology, the
condition is difficult to check in networks where each node has many quorum
slices, and further there is no obvious way to input a topology and get a clear
metric of how tolerant it is to Byzantine faults. This could lead to building up
under-analyzed, frail topologies that seem safe but spontaneously break as soon
as a single Byzantine node starts behaving dishonestly. Mazie`res justifies the
safety of the system by comparing it to the Internet, which is a robust system
that similarly takes advantage of transitive connections. In practice though, the
Internet suffers transient failures due to accidental misconfigurations relatively
frequently [19]. This is not a serious problem for the Internet since it can
only fail by temporarily losing connectivity; in contrast, a consensus network
cannot be repaired after forking without potentially stealing money from honest
actors. We therefore prefer an algorithm that is more restrictive but easier
to analyze clearly; and regardless, if a node desires the greater flexibility of
Mazie`res’ protocol, then it can transitively add its peers’ essential subsets out-
of-protocol and get the same exact benefits. Finally, Mazie`res’ protocol is again
only weakly asynchronous and not robust.
In an attempt to resolve the inefficiency of proof-of-work, many decentral-
ized currencies are moving towards proof-of-stake, in which a node’s “mining
power” is tied to the amount of funds it locks up as collateral [7]. Although tra-
ditional proof-of-stake algorithms only guarantee asymptotic consensus and so
are not applicable to our problem definition (in particular their safety depends
on synchrony assumptions), another interesting avenue is to use a proof-of-stake
algorithm to give nodes weighted voting power and develop a distributed con-
sensus algorithm that is safe as long as enough of the total weighted voting
power belongs to honest nodes. This idea is explored in Kwon’s Tendermint
protocol [17]. These protocols make decentralization easy because there is no
fear of becoming inconsistent due to a misconfiguration, while avoiding Sybil
attacks by tying voting power to a limited resource.
Tendermint is again not robust and requires weak asynchrony, but it seems
likely that a fully asynchronous algorithm like SINTRA or Honeybadger could be
adapted to this setting. However, assuming the system uses hierarchical thresh-
old secrets in the sense proposed by Shamir [25] for instantiating common coins,
then making the set of possible voting power weights even moderately fine would
1In particular, the “quorum slices” of Mazie`res’s paper appear very similar to our definition
of “essential subsets”. However, the way in which Mazie`res’s algorithm uses quorum slices to
determine support is different from the way Cobalt uses essential subsets: in fact, the “quorum
slices” in our model would be actually be all the sets of nodes in UNLi whose intersection with
every essential subset S ∈ ESi has size at least qS .
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rapidly degrade the performance of the system, until just reconstructing a single
coin value might take minutes to compute, regardless of how many participants
the network has. Further, Tendermint-like protocols require listening to every
node in the network, which quickly becomes inefficient in very large networks,
and is only made worse when trying to adapt to full asynchrony, which typically
requires Ω(n3) messages to be exchanged to reach consensus.
Another issue is that stake in a system’s success is not necessarily correlated
with understanding how best to improve the system. For verifying transactions
– the use case Tendermint was designed for – it is easy to justify tying author-
ity to stake, since the behavior that best benefits the system is obvious and
undebatable: simply run the protocol exactly as specified. For application to
a governance system however, it is entirely possible for actors with good inten-
tions to make poor decisions about how the system should operate. By allowing
participants to explicitly delegate who they believe to be trustworthy, Cobalt
can give authority to those who are best at making good decisions for the future
of the network, rather than those who are simply incentivized against attacking
the network.
Perhaps most importantly though, using proof-of-stake for determining vot-
ing power would be a poor decision for the XRP Ledger, since at the time of
writing this paper, Ripple the company owns a majority of the XRP in exis-
tence, putting a dangerous amount of authority in a single location. Although
Ripple is highly incentivized not to abuse this power since a loss of faith in XRP
could render Ripple’s XRP holdings worthless, if nothing else this gives hackers
a single point of entry with which they could take over the entire network due
to a careless human error.
4 The Cobalt Protocol
In this section we describe the details of Cobalt, a protocol that solves demo-
cratic atomic broadcast in the open network model presented in section 2. Before
describing the full Cobalt protocol, we first detail certain lower level primitives
that are used as part of the Cobalt algorithm. Although most of these primitives
are familiar tools in the complete network model, to the author’s knowledge no
one else has adapted these primitives to fit our model, so we present novel in-
stantiations of them. Since none of these protocols have been presented in our
network model before, we prove by hand that every protocol is correct.
In all proofs, we make no implicit assumptions about the network connec-
tivity or the number of Byzantine faults controlled by the adversary. If we need
to assume some network connectivity or limitation on the tolerated Byzantine
faults, we will state that assumption in the proposition.
Before delving into the protocols, we first develop some definitions and de-
scribe two mechanics that we use repeatedly in our protocols. These two me-
chanics underlie most of the basic techniques for developing consensus protocols
in the complete network model, so adapting them to our model will allow us to
easily adapt protocols for two of our lower level primitives, reliable broadcast
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and binary agreement.
Two nodes Pi and Pj are said to be linked if there is some essential subset
S ∈ ESi ∩ ESj such that fewer than tS nodes in S are actively Byzantine faulty.
We say some property is local if the property holds between two nodes iff those
two nodes are linked, regardless of whether any other nodes in the network are
linked. Local properties are nice because they ensure that poorly configured
nodes cannot harm correctly configured nodes. We will later prove that con-
sistency is a local property, which we stress is very important for making the
network topology easy to analyze. To the author’s knowledge, Cobalt is the
first incomplete network consensus algorithm for which consistency is a local
property; for instance, locality does not hold for either the original XRP Ledger
Consensus Protocol [24] nor the protocol of Mazie`res [20].
Similarly, two nodes Pi and Pj are fully linked if there is some essential
subset S ∈ ESi ∩ ESj such that at least qS nodes in S are correct, at most tS
nodes in S are actively Byzantine faulty, and tS 6 nS− qS . Note that if nS− qS
is greater than tS , then we still allow nS − qS nodes to be faulty, as long as
they are not actively Byzantine (e.g., they can be crashed). Also note that full
linkage implies linkage. While linkage is important for consistency, full linkage
is important for forward progress.
A node Pi is healthy if it is honest and at most min{tS, nS − qS} nodes
in each of its essential subsets S ∈ ESi are not healthy. This definition can
be made non-cyclical by considering a sequence of sets Fi starting with F0 as
the set of actively Byzantine nodes and Fi the set of nodes with too many
Fi−1 nodes in one of its essential subsets, then taking the unhealthy nodes to
be the union across the Fi. Healthy nodes are exactly the nodes that cannot
be made to accept and/or broadcast random messages at the suggestion of
actively Byzantine nodes. Pi is unblocked if it is healthy and correct, and at
most min{tS , nS − qS} nodes in each of its essential subsets S ∈ ESi are not
unblocked. Blocked nodes can be arbitrarily prevented from terminating by the
Byzantine nodes.
A node Pi is strongly connected if every pair of healthy nodes in UNL
∞
i
are fully linked with each other. Strong connectivity represents the weakest
equivalent of “global full linkage”: from Pi’s perspective, everyone in the net-
work is fully linked. With a bit of effort, nonlocal properties can usually still
be salvaged as only requiring strong connectivity rather than actually requiring
that every pair of correct nodes in the network be fully linked. This is still some-
what nicer than requiring global full linkage, as at least no poorly configured
nodes that you don’t know about can harm you.
The final definition we need is weak connectivity. A node Pi is weakly
connected if Pi is fully linked with every healthy node in UNL
∞
i . Weak con-
nectivity is in general much easier to guarantee than strong connectivity, since
it doesn’t place any requirements on how other pairs of nodes are fully linked
with each other. Note though that strong connectivity only technically implies
weak connectivity for healthy nodes. Generally weak connectivity is needed to
guarantee that the network “treats you fairly” and doesn’t come to decisions
that seem wrong to you based on what you receive from your essential subsets.
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The following two lemmas provide the fundamental basis underpinning our
algorithms.
Lemma 1. Let Pi be any honest node, and let Pj be any correct node which
is fully linked with Pi. Then if Pi receives some message M from qS nodes in
every essential subset S ∈ ESi, then eventually Pj will receive M from tS + 1
nodes in some essential subset S ∈ ESj.
Proof. Since Pi and Pj are fully linked, by definition there is some essential
subset Sshared ∈ ESi ∩ ESj . Thus if Pi receives some message M from qS nodes
in every essential subset S ∈ ESi, then in particular it receives M from qSshared
nodes in Sshared. At most tSshared of these nodes could have been actively
Byzantine, so using equation 2,
qSshared − tSshared > qSshared − (2qSshared − nSshared)
= nSshared − qSshared
> tSshared ,
where the last inequality uses the definition of full linkage. Therefore at least
tSshared + 1 non-actively Byzantine nodes in Sshared must have broadcast M .
Since we assume that honest nodes can only communicate by sending the same
message to everyone in that listens to them, these honest nodes must have
also sent M to Pj , so eventually Pj will receive M from tSshared + 1 nodes in
Sshared ∈ ESj .
Lemma 2. Let Pi be any correct node, and let Pj be any correct node which
is linked to Pi. Then if Pi receives some message M from qS nodes in every
essential subset S ∈ ESi, then Pj cannot receive a message M ′ that contradicts
M from qS nodes in every essential subset S ∈ ESj.
Proof. By definition of linkage, there must be some Sshared ∈ ESi ∩ ESj such
that at most tSshared nodes in Sshared are actively Byzantine. By the same
equations as in lemma 1 (minus the last inequality, which requires full linkage),
if Pi receivesM from qSshared nodes in Sshared then more than nSshared−qSshared
honest nodes in Sshared sent M . Since honest nodes cannot broadcast both M
′
and M , fewer than nSshared − (nSshared − qSshared) = qSshared nodes in Sshared
can send M ′ to Pj.
In light of the previous lemmas, we make two more definitions. A node Pi
sees strong support for a message M if Pi receives M from qS nodes in every
essential subset S ∈ ESi. Similarly, Pi sees weak support for a message M if
Pi receives M from tS + 1 nodes in some essential subset S ∈ ESi.
Using these definitions, lemma 1 can be phrased as “fully linked nodes have
enough overlap to where if one node sees strong support then the other will
eventually see weak support”, and lemma 2 can be phrased as “linked nodes have
enough overlap to where they cannot simultaneously both see strong support
for contradictory messages”. It turns out that relating nodes in these two ways
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is enough to recover most of the techniques used in developing BFT algorithms
from the complete network case, allowing us to easily adapt many algorithms
to our model.
4.1 Cryptographic Randomness
Before we can define the Cobalt protocol, one remaining piece needs to be
developed. As mentioned at the end of section 2, Cobalt uses cryptography to
generate common pseudorandom values that are unpredictable by the network
adversary in order to sidestep the FLP result [16].
Let S be a probability space with probability measure P . We define a
common random source or CRS to be a protocol where nodes can sample
at any time, and then output some value according to the following properties:
• CRS-Consistency: If any honest node outputs s, then no honest node
linked to it ever outputs s′ 6= s.
• CRS-Termination: If Pi is strongly connected and every unblocked node in
UNL
∞
i samples the CRS, then every unblocked node in UNL
∞
i eventually
produces an output.
• CRS-Randomness: Suppose Pi is correct and weakly connected, at most tS
nodes in every essential subset S ∈ ESi are controlled by the adversary, and
Pi eventually outputs s. Then for any value x produced by the adversary
before any healthy node in UNLi has sampled the CRS, with overwhelming
probability |Pr[s = x]− P (x)| 6 ǫ for negligible ǫ.
The last property formalizes the idea that the adversary cannot get a signif-
icantly better prediction of the random output than it would by just randomly
picking a value from S.
We postpone describing the concrete details of this protocol until ap-
pendix B.
4.2 Reliable Broadcast
4.2.1 Definition
Reliable broadcast, or RBC, is a basic primitive that allows a specified
broadcaster to send a message to the network, and guarantees that even if
the broadcaster is Byzantine faulty, it must send the same message to every
node. For the protocol definition, the broadcaster may or may not be a node
within the network; however, when using RBC within Cobalt we only ever use
it in the context where the broadcaster is a node in the network.
More formally, a reliable broadcast protocol is any protocol where a specified
broadcaster entity Bi inputs an arbitrary message, and every node can accept
some message, subject to the following properties:
• RBC-Consistency: If any honest node accepts a messageM , then no hon-
est node linked to it ever accepts any message M ′ 6=M .
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• RBC-Reliability: If Pi is strongly connected and any healthy node in
UNL
∞
i accepts a message M , then every unblocked node in UNL
∞
i even-
tually accepts M .
• RBC-Validity: If Bi is honest and inputs the messageM , then any healthy
node that accepts a message must accept M .
• RBC-Non-Triviality: If Bi is honest and can broadcast to every correct
node in the network, then eventually every unblocked node will acceptM .
Most researchers combine Consistency and Reliability into one property, but we
keep them separate since the network assumptions needed for Consistency are so
much weaker. Most researchers also combine Validity and Non-Triviality, since
its assumed that every node can broadcast to the entire network. Since in our
network model we do not assume that all nodes have communication channels
between them, Bi might be isolated from the rest of the network, so combining
these properties doesn’t work.
4.2.2 Protocol
In the complete network model, the canonical reliable broadcast protocol is due
to Bracha [6]. Our protocol is closely modeled after Bracha’s protocol, and
behaves exactly the same in the complete network case.
The protocol begins by having Bi broadcast INIT (M) to everyone listening
to it. After that, each node Pj (including j = i, if Bi is a member of the
network) runs the following protocol2.
1. Upon receiving an INIT (M) message directly from Bi, broadcast
ECHO(M) if we have not yet broadcast ECHO( ).
2. Upon receiving weak support for ECHO(M), broadcast ECHO(M) if we
have not yet broadcast ECHO( ).
3. Upon receiving strong support for ECHO(M), broadcast READY (M) if
we have not yet broadcast READY ( ).
4. Upon receiving weak support for READY (M), broadcast READY (M)
if we have not yet broadcast READY ( ).
5. Upon receiving strong support for READY (M), accept M .
When multiple instances of reliable broadcast might be running at the same
time, we tag each message with a unique instance id to differentiate them.
Step 2 is not technically necessary, but it makes it somewhat easier to reliably
broadcast to the network. Note that since we assume that every message is
cryptographically signed by the sender, if we also include the public key of Bi
(which may not be known to all nodes) in the instance tag, then in step 1 we
2In our protocol descriptions, we use the underscore notation to refer to “any possible
value”.
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could actually broadcast ECHO(M) even if we only receive ECHO(M) from a
single node, as long as we also include Bi’s signature with it. This would make
it even easier for nodes to reliably broadcast to the network. The only security
risk for allowing more nodes to reliably broadcast is the possibility of allowing
spam to congest the network; since spammers can be eventually excluded, there
is little value in trying to make it harder for nodes to reliably broadcast.
4.2.3 Analysis
Reliable broadcast can be split into two phases: the “echo” phase and the
“ready” phase, distinguished by the labels on the messages from each phase.
Roughly speaking, the echo phase serves to guarantee that everyone accepts the
same message (consistency) while the second phase guarantees that if anyone
accepts a message then so does everyone else (reliability).
Proposition 3. Suppose two correct nodes Pi and Pj are linked and they accept
the messages M and M ′, respectively. Then M =M ′.
Proof. By step 5 of the RBC algorithm, a node only accepts a message M if it
receives READY (M) strong support for M . Since RBC restricts nodes to only
broadcast a single message for each label, by lemma 2, M =M ′.
Although consistency is local as the previous proposition shows, unfortu-
nately the stronger property of reliability is not local.
Lemma 4. Suppose Pk is strongly connected and two healthy nodes Pi,Pj ∈
UNL
∞
k broadcast READY (M) and READY (M
′), respectively. Then M =M ′.
Proof. By steps 3 and 4 of the reliable broadcast protocol, an honest node Pi can
only broadcast READY (M) for some message M if either 1) it received strong
support for ECHO(M), or 2) it received weak support for READY (M). In
the latter case, if Pi is healthy then this implies in particular that some healthy
node in UNLi ⊆ UNL
∞
k broadcast READY (M) before Pi. Since there are only
a finite number of nodes in UNL∞k , there must exist some healthy node Pi′ in
UNL
∞
k that broadcast READY (M) before any other healthy node in its UNL.
In particular, Pi′ must have broadcast READY (M) due to having received
strong support for ECHO(M).
Thus if two healthy nodes Pi,Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k broadcast READY (M) and
READY (M ′), respectively, then we can assume that there are two healthy
nodes Pi′ ,Pj′ ∈ UNL
∞
k such that Pi′ received strong support for ECHO(M)
while Pj′ received strong support for ECHO(M
′). Since Pk is strongly con-
nected by assumption, Pi′ and Pj′ are linked, so by lemma 2 M =M ′.
Proposition 5. If Pk is strongly connected and any healthy node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k
accepts the message M , then every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k will eventually
accept M .
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Proof. Since every pair of healthy nodes in UNL∞k are fully linked by assumption,
if Pi acceptsM then by lemma 1, eventually every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k will
eventually see weak support for READY (M). By lemma 4, no healthy node
in UNL∞k can have previously broadcast READY (M
′) for any M ′ 6= M , so by
step 4 of the RBC protocol, eventually every healthy and correct node in UNL∞k
broadcasts READY (M). In particular, if Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k , then every healthy and
correct node in UNLj ⊆ UNL
∞
k eventually broadcasts READY (M), so if Pj is
unblocked then eventually Pj receives strong support for READY (M). Thus
Pj accepts M by step 5 of the protocol.
Proposition 6. If Bi is honest, then no healthy node can accept a message not
broadcast by Bi.
Proof. This follows from a simple analysis of the protocol by noting that a
healthy node can’t broadcast ECHO(M) without either receiving INIT (M)
from Bi or receiving ECHO(M) from another healthy node. Thus if Bi only
broadcasts INIT (M), then no healthy node will broadcast ECHO(M ′) for any
M ′ 6= M . By similar logic, no healthy node will broadcast READY (M ′) for
any M ′ 6= M , so no healthy node will ever see enough READY (M ′) messages
to accept M ′.
Proposition 7. If Bi is correct and can broadcast to every correct node in the
network, then eventually every unblocked node will accept M .
Proof. Since every node can receive INIT (M) from Bi, every healthy and cor-
rect node will broadcast ECHO(M), so eventually every healthy and correct
node will broadcast READY (M), so eventually every unblocked node will ac-
cept M .
Theorem 8. The RBC protocol defined in section 4.2.2 satisfies the properties
of a reliable broadcast algorithm in the open network model.
Proof. Consistency is proven in proposition 3. Reliability is proven in proposi-
tion 5. Validity is proven in proposition 6. Non-triviality is proven in proposi-
tion 7.
4.2.4 Democratic Reliable Broadcast
We will also find useful a slight variation on RBC called democratic reliable
broadcast or DRBC.
A DRBC protocol is similar to RBC except it allows nodes to choose whether
to support or oppose messages that are broadcast, and replaces non-triviality
with the following properties:
• DRBC-Democracy: If any healthy node Pi is weakly connected and ac-
cepts the messageM , then there exists some essential subset S ∈ ESi such
that the majority of all honest nodes in S supported M .
17
• DRBC-Censorship-Resilience: If a Bi can broadcast to every correct node
in the network, and all correct nodes support M , then eventually every
unblocked node will accept M .
One can easily transform the above RBC protocol into a DRBC protocol by
specifying that each node only broadcasts an ECHO(M) message iff it supports
M (note though that a node may still need to broadcast READY (M) even if
it doesn’t support M).
Proposition 9. If any healthy node Pk is weakly connected and accepts the
message M , then there is some essential subset S ∈ ESk such that the majority
of honest nodes in S supported M .
Proof. If any healthy node in UNL∞k broadcasts READY (M), there must
have been a healthy node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k that was the first healthy node in
UNL
∞
k to broadcast READY (M). Then Pi must have seen strong support
for ECHO(M). By weak connectivity, Pi and Pk are fully linked (and in
particular, linked), so there must be some essential subset S ∈ ESk such
that at least qS − tS honest nodes in S broadcast ECHO(M), while at most
nS − qS honest nodes in S did not broadcast ECHO(M). By equation 2,
qS − tS > qS − (2qS −nS) = nS − qS , so the majority of honest nodes in S must
have supported M .
Theorem 10. The modified protocol defined in section 4.2.2 satisfies the prop-
erties of a democratic reliable broadcast algorithm in the open network model.
Proof. Consistency, reliability, and validity all still hold with the modified algo-
rithm, since none of the proofs for those properties in theorem 8 assume that any
nodes are guaranteed to broadcast an ECHO message. Democracy is proven
in proposition 9.
The proof of Censorship Resilience is identical to the proof of RBC-Non-
Triviality, since if every correct node supports M then eventually every healthy
and correct node will broadcast ECHO(M).
4.3 Binary Agreement
4.3.1 Definition
The other low level primitive we need is asynchronous binary Byzantine
agreement or ABBA. ABBA is the most basic consensus primitive: every
node inputs some bit, and then all the nodes agree on a single bit that was
input by some honest node.
More formally, an ABBA protocol allow each node to input a single bit, and
then every node outputs a single bit according to the following properties:
• ABBA-Consistency: Two honest, linked nodes cannot output different
values.
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• ABBA-Termination: If Pk is strongly connected and every unblocked node
in UNL∞k provides some input to the algorithm, then eventually every
unblocked node in UNL∞k terminates with probability 1.
• ABBA-Validity: If any unblocked node outputs v, then some unblocked
node must have input v.
The above definition of Validity is common in the complete network model,
but it turns out to be too weak for our purposes. Indeed, an algorithm that
only satisfies the above Validity property could decide 1 even if some totally
isolated honest node were the only node that voted 1. We thus actually need a
stronger notion of validity to guarantee correctness of Cobalt:
• ABBA-Strong-Validity: If any unblocked node Pi outputs v, then there is
some chain of unblocked nodes Pi = Pi0 ,Pi1 , ...,Pin , where for all k 6 n,
Pik ∈ UNLik−1 , and the node Pin input v.
Although rather awkward, the Strong Validity property turns out to be just
strong enough for our purposes.
4.3.2 Protocol
Our ABBA protocol is based off of a binary agreement protocol designed for
complete networks by Moste´faoui et al. [22]. The protocol by Moste´faoui et
al. is fully asynchronous and uses a CRS in the form of a “common coin”.
It takes longer on average to terminate compared to an earlier protocol in the
same model developed by Cachin et al. [10]; unfortunately it seems impossible to
develop a simple adaptation for Cachin et al.’s protocol, since the cryptographic
proofs it uses to justify messages don’t seem to work in our model3
For the protocol, we use a sequence ρr of common random sources that each
sample uniformly from {0, 1} for every r > 0.
The protocol works as follows, run from the perspective of Pi:
1. Upon receiving weak support for FINISH(v) for some binary value v,
broadcast FINISH(v) if we haven’t yet broadcast FINISH( ).
2. Upon receiving strong support for FINISH(v), output v and terminate.
3. Set valuesri = ∅ for all r > 0. Upon Pi providing an input value vin, set
r = 0 and estri = vin.
3Of course, threshold signatures as used in Cachin et al.’s original specification don’t work
in our model. But even replacing threshold signatures with multisignatures, if a node Pi
broadcasts a “main message” voting 1 after seeing qS valid “pre messages” voting 1 from
every S ∈ ESi, then because not all nodes know each other’s essential subsets, the validity
proof of this main message only proves to Pj that some S ∈ ESj sent qS valid pre messages
voting 1 to Pi; but Pj then still doesn’t know if there might be some node Pk for which
no S ∈ ESk sent qS valid pre messages voting 1 to Pi. Thus a Byzantine node could send
opposite valid main messages to two nodes that don’t know about each other, and guarantee
that they never agree.
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4. Broadcast INIT (estri , r).
5. Upon receiving weak support for INIT (v, r), broadcast INIT (v, r).
6. Upon receiving strong support for INIT (v, r), add v to valuesri and broad-
cast AUX(v, r) if we have not already broadcast AUX( , r).
7. For every essential subset S ∈ ESi, wait until there exists some subset
T ⊆ S, such that |T | > qS and from every node in T we receivedAUX(v, r)
for some v ∈ valuesri (possibly different v for different nodes in T ). Then
broadcast CONF (valuesri , r).
8. For every essential subset S ∈ ESi, wait until there exists some subset T ⊆
S, such that |T | > qS and from every node in T we received CONF (C, r)
for some C ⊆ valuesri (possibly different C for different nodes in T ).
9. Sample from ρr and place its value in sr.
10. If |valuesri | = 2, then set est
r+1
i = sr. If values
r
i = {v} for some v, then
set estr+1i = v. If in fact values
r
i = {sr}, then additionally broadcast
FINISH(sr) if we have not yet broadcast FINISH( ).
Set r = r + 1 and return to step 4.
The above protocol is defined asynchronously, so that once you get to some
step in the protocol you keep running that step forever if its logic has not been
satisfied by the time you get to the next step. So for instance, the logic involving
the FINISH messages in steps 1 and 2 should be continuously checked even
after you get to the later steps.
The original protocol of Moste´faoui et al. did not use the CONF messages or
the FINISH messages. The FINISH messages are necessary for guaranteeing
consistency is a local property. The CONF messages are necessary because our
definition of a CRS is weaker than a true common coin as assumed in the original
protocol. The use of CONF messages in step 8 ensures that if any node Pi gets
to step 10 with valuesri = {v}, then the value of sr is practically independent of
the value of v.
4.3.3 Analysis
Proposition 11. If two honest nodes Pi and Pj are linked, then they cannot
output different binary values.
Proof. Since an honest node can only broadcast a single FINISH message, by
the condition for outputting a binary value v in step 2 and lemma 2, Pi and Pj
cannot output different values.
The above proposition shows why we use the FINISH message. Note
that the part of the protocol involving the FINISH message is not present
in Moste´faoui et al.’s algorithm. The original version instead has nodes that
get valuesr = {sr} for some round r wait until they sample some CRS ρr′ with
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r′ > r that returns sr′ = sr. This change is not fundamental to the open
network model (indeed, the original version works fine in our model, and our
version works fine in Moste´faoui et al.’s model). However, as shown in 11, adding
the FINISH message makes agreement a local property, which is a great bonus
in the open network model. Thus we prefer the modified version, even though
it incurs an extra communication round. Without using the FINISH message
step, the above proposition does not hold, since nodes can realize ABBA has
terminated in different rounds, and unlinked nodes in a late terminator’s UNL
can shift their opinions to the opposite value after the earlier node has already
terminated.
We now move onto proving termination and validity. These properties are
significantly more involved than agreement, so we try to break the proofs into
the smallest chunks possible.
Each round of the binary agreement protocol described in section 4.3.2
breaks roughly into three phases. Similar to the case of RBC, the phases can be
divided by the labels on the messages involved in each phase: the first phase is
the “initialization” phase, and comprises steps 5 and 6 involving the INIT mes-
sages; the second phase is the “auxiliary” phase in steps 6 and 7 that involves
the AUX messages; the third phase is the “confirmation” phase in steps 6 and
8 that involves the CONF messages.
We begin by proving lemmas representing the correctness of the initialization
phase.
Lemma 12. If Pi is unblocked and adds v to values
r
i , then there is some chain
of unblocked nodes Pi = Pi0 ,Pi1 , ...,Pin , where for all k 6 n, Pik ∈ UNLik−1 ,
and estrin = v.
Proof. If Pi adds v to values
r
i , then certainly some unblocked node Pi1 ∈ UNLi
must have broadcast INIT (r, v) by the logic in step 6 for adding a value to
values
r
i . But an unblocked node Pik only broadcasts INIT (r, v) if either est
r
ik
=
v or there was some unblocked node in its UNL that broadcast INIT (r, v)
before Pik did. By repeating, we successively build up the chain of unblocked
nodes until we eventually reach some unblocked node that had estrin = v, since
UNL
∞
i is finite implying that at some point we must reach an unblocked node
that sent INIT (r, v) before any other unblocked node in its UNL.
Lemma 13. If Pk is strongly connected and any honest node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k adds
v to valuesri , then every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k will eventually add v to
values
r
j .
Proof. Identical to the proof of proposition 5.
Lemma 14. If Pk is strongly connected, every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k gets
to step 4 for round r, and no unblocked nodes in UNL∞k terminate in round r,
then eventually every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k adds some value to values
r
j .
Proof. For convenience, given some essential subset S define the majority in-
put vS to be the binary value set for est
r
i by the majority of unblocked nodes
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Pi ∈ S. Then once all these unblocked nodes get to step 4 in round r, if any
unblocked node Pi listens to S there must be at least qS unblocked nodes in S,
so Pi will eventually receive INIT (r, vS) messages from more than qS/2 > tS
nodes in S, causing Pi to broadcast INIT (r, vS) according to the condition in
step 5.
Let Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k be some unblocked node. Suppose every essential subset
S ∈ ESi has the same majority vote v. Then since Pi ⊆ UNL
∞
k , Pi is fully
linked with every unblocked node in UNLi, so eventually every unblocked node
in UNLi broadcasts INIT (r, v) by the preceding paragraph. Thus Pi adds v to
values
r
i in step 6, and by lemma 13 every node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k also eventually adds
v to valuesrj .
It remains to show the case where every unblocked node in UNL∞k maintains
two essential subsets S, S′ with vS 6= vS′ . But in this case by the first para-
graph every unblocked node in UNL∞k eventually broadcasts both INIT (r, 0)
and INIT (r, 1). Thus every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k eventually adds both
0 and 1 to valuesrj .
Note that in the previous lemma the reason why we needed to specify “no
unblocked nodes in UNL∞k terminate in round r” is because a node can possibly
terminate at any time if it receives enough FINISH messages, and therefore
stop participating before adding a value to valuesr.
We now move onto the auxiliary phase.
Lemma 15. If two honest nodes Pi and Pj are linked, then if Pi continues to
step 8 in round r with valuesri = {v}, Pj cannot continue to step 8 in round r
with valuesrj = {¬v}.
Proof. In order to progress to step 8 with valuesri = {v}, Pi must receive strong
support for AUX(v, r). The lemma thus holds immediately by lemma 2.
Note that the above proposition doesn’t guarantee that Pj will continue to
step 8 with valuesrj = {v}. Instead Pj might continue to step 8 with values
r
j =
{0, 1}.
Lemma 16. If Pk is strongly connected, every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k gets to
step 4 for round r, and no unblocked nodes in UNL∞k terminate in round r, then
eventually every unblocked node in UNL∞k either progresses to step 8 in round r
or terminates.
Proof. By lemma 14, eventually every unblocked node in UNL∞k broadcasts an
AUX message in round r. Further, by lemma 13 if any unblocked node Pi ∈
UNL
∞
k broadcasts AUX(v, r) then eventually every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k
adds v to valuesrj . Thus for any unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k , every unblocked
node in UNLj will broadcast AUX(v, r) for some v which is eventually added
to valuesrj , so eventually Pj can progress to step 8 since there are at least qS
unblocked nodes in every essential subset S ∈ ESj .
Finally, we make three quick lemmas about the confirmation phase.
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Lemma 17. If two honest nodes Pi and Pj are linked, then if Pi continues to
step 10 in round r with valuesri = {v}, Pj cannot continue to step 8 in round r
with valuesrj = {¬v}.
Proof. Identical to the proof of lemma 15.
Lemma 18. If Pk is strongly connected, every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k gets
to step 4 for round r, and no unblocked nodes in UNL∞k terminate in round r,
then eventually every unblocked node in UNL∞k either progresses to step 10 in
round r or terminates.
Proof. By an identical proof to lemma 16, every unblocked node progresses to
step 9. The lemma thus follows from CRS-Termination.
The final lemma for this phase shows why the confirmation phase is needed.
It prevents the adversary from “gaming” the CRS to learn the value it returns
in advance and using that information to artificially coordinate the system to
prevent termination.
Lemma 19. If Pk is strongly connected and some healthy node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k
progresses to step 10 in round r with valuesri = {v}, then |Pr[sr = v]− 1/2| 6 ǫ
for some negligible ǫ.
Proof. In order for Pi to progress to step 10 in round r with values
r
i = {v}, Pi
must have received strong support for CONF ({v}, r). By strong connectivity of
Pk, then any healthy node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k that samples ρr in step 9 must have done
so after receiving strong support for CONF ({v}, r) from some healthy node in
UNL
∞
k . By lemma 15, it cannot be the case that one healthy node in UNL
∞
k
broadcast CONF ({0}, r) while another healthy node broadcast CONF ({1}, r);
thus the value of v must have been determined before Pj sampled ρr. Since ρr
samples randomly from {0, 1}, by CRS-Randomness |Pr[sr = v] − 1/2| 6 ǫ for
negligible ǫ.
We need two more quick lemmas that don’t tie into either of the above
“phases”, but rather deal with the correctness of the overall algorithm.
Lemma 20. If Pi is unblocked and outputs the value v, then there is some chain
of unblocked nodes Pi = Pi0 ,Pi1 , ...,Pin , where for all k 6 n, Pik ∈ UNLik−1 ,
and the node Pin broadcast FINISH(v) due to the logic in step 10.
Proof. Identical to the proof of lemma 12.
Lemma 21. If Pk is strongly connected, and in some round r a healthy node
Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k gets to step 10 with values
r
i = {sr} where sr is the value obtained
from the random oracle ρr, then for every r
′ > r, any healthy node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k
that begins round r′ does so with estr
′
j = sr.
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Proof. Suppose in round r′ every healthy node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k that begins round
r′ does so with estr
′
j = sr. By taking the contrapositive of lemma 12, one
finds that every healthy node that gets to step 10 in round r′ must do so with
valuesr′ = {sr}. Thus every healthy node Pj that begins round r
′ + 1 does so
with estr
′
+1
j = sr.
Therefore by induction it suffices to show that if in some round r a healthy
node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k gets to step 10 with valuesr = {sr}, then every healthy
node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k that begins round r + 1 does so with est
r+1
j = sr. But by
lemma 15 and the assumption that Pk is strongly connected, any healthy node
Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k that gets to step 10 in round r must do so with either values
r
j = {sr}
or valuesrj = {0, 1}. In the former case, Pj continues to round r + 1 with
est
r+1
j = sr. In the latter case, Pj takes the value obtained from ρr as est
r+1
j ;
but by CRS-Agreement Pj outputs the same random value as Pi, so again Pj
continues to round r + 1 with estr+1j = sr.
Now with all of those lemmas out of the way, we can finally prove the cor-
rectness of the overall algorithm.
Proposition 22. If Pi is unblocked and outputs v, then there is some chain of
unblocked nodes Pi = Pi0 ,Pi1 , ...,Pin , where for all k 6 n, Pik ∈ UNLik−1 , and
the node Pin input v.
Proof. By lemma 20, we can construct a chain of unblocked nodes Pi =
Pi0 ,Pi1 , ...,Pinr+1 , where for all k 6 nr+1, Pik ∈ UNLik−1 , and the node Pin
broadcast FINISH(v) due to the logic in step 10 in round r for some r > 0.
In particular, Pinr+1 gets to step 10 in round r with values
r
inr+1
= {v}.
We work backwards from r to extend the chain until it reaches an unblocked
node that input v.
Let r′ 6 r and suppose Pin
r′+1
is some unblocked node that gets to step 10
in round r′ with v ∈ valuesr
′
in
r′+1
. By lemma 12, there is some chain of un-
blocked nodes Pin
r′+1
,Pin
r′+1
+1, ...,Pin
r′
, where for all k 6 n, Pik ∈ UNLik−1
and estr
′
ir′
= v. But then either r′ = 0 and Pi
r′
input v, or r′ > 0 and Pi
r′
must
have gotten to step 10 in round r′ − 1 with v ∈ valuesr
′
−1
ir′
.
By repeating the above logic until we reach r′ = 0, we build out a chain
Pi = Pi0 ,Pi1 , ...,Pin0 satisfying the requirements of the proposition.
Proposition 23. If Pk is strongly connected and every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k
provides some input to the algorithm, then eventually every unblocked node in
UNL
∞
k terminates with probability 1.
Proof. Note that by lemma 21, any two unblocked nodes that broadcast
FINISH messages due to the logic in step 10 must broadcast the same
FINISH message. Thus by the same proof as proposition 5, if any unblocked
node in UNL∞k terminates then all unblocked nodes in UNL
∞
k terminate.
Once every unblocked node in UNL∞k provides some input in round 0 then
by applying lemma 16 inductively one sees that for every r > 0, either all nodes
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get to round r or some unblocked node in UNL∞k terminates before then. By
the preceding paragraph, we derive that either every unblocked node in UNL∞k
eventually terminates, or every unblocked node in UNL∞k gets to round r for
every r > 0.
Suppose in some round r every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k gets to step 10
with valuesrj = {0, 1}. Then every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k will begin round
r+1 with estimate set to the random oracle value from round r, so in particular
every unblocked node begins round r + 1 with a common value s for their
estimates. As in the proof of lemma 21, this implies that for all r′ > r, every
node will get to step 10 with valuesr
′
= {s}. Thus as soon as the CRS ρr′
returns s for some r′ > r—which happens within a finite number of rounds
with probability 1, and in fact takes only 2 + ǫ rounds in expectation for a
negligible ǫ—every unblocked node in UNL∞k broadcasts FINISH(s), allowing
every unblocked node to terminate.
Now on the other hand if in round r there is some unblocked node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k
that gets to step 10 with valuesri = {v}, then either sr = v, in which case by
lemma 21 and lemma 12 every unblocked node in UNL∞k will get to step 10 in
round r′ with valuesr
′
= {s} for every r′ > r, and as in the previous paragraph
every unblocked node terminates with probability 1. Otherwise the oracle in
round r returns ¬v, in which case the nodes go into the next round with some
arbitrary state. However, by lemma 19 there is at least 1/2 − ǫ chance of the
first option occurring, so with probability 1 every unblocked node in UNL∞k
eventually terminates.
Theorem 24. The protocol defined in section 4.3.2 satisfies the properties of an
asynchronous Byzantine binary agreement algorithm in the open network model.
Proof. Agreement is proven in proposition 11. Termination is proven in propo-
sition 23. Strong Validity (and hence plain Validity as well) is proven in propo-
sition 22.
4.4 Democratic Atomic Broadcast
4.4.1 Definition
Although we loosely defined the DABC problem in section 2, at the time we were
unable to explicitly describe the network assumptions required for each property
to hold, so we reiterate the problem definition and clarify the assumptions now.
As stated in section 2, a protocol that solves DABC allows proposers to
broadcast amendments to the network. Each node can choose to either support
or oppose each amendment it receives, and then each node over time ratifies
some of those amendments and assigns each ratified amendment an activation
time, according to the following properties:
• DABC-Agreement: If Pk is strongly connected and some healthy node in
UNL
∞
k ratifies an amendment A an assigns it the activation time τ , then
eventually every unblocked node in UNL∞k also ratifies A with probability
1 and assigns it the activation time τ .
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• DABC-Linearizability: If any honest node ratifies an amendment A before
ratifying some other amendment A′, then every other honest node linked
to it ratifies A before A′.
• DABC-Democracy: If any healthy node Pi is weakly connected and ratifies
an amendment A, then there exists some essential subset S ∈ ESi such
that the majority of all honest nodes in S supported A being ratified, and
further supported A being ratified in the context of all the amendments
ratified before A.
• DABC-Liveness: If Pk is strongly connected and every unblocked node
in UNL∞k supports some unratified amendment A, then eventually every
unblocked node in UNL∞k ratifies a new amendment with probability 1.
• DABC-Full-Knowledge: For every time τ , a healthy node that is weakly
connected can wait some amount of time and afterwards know that it is
aware of every amendment that will be ratified with an activation time
less than τ . Further, if Pk is strongly connected, then any unblocked node
in UNL∞k only needs to wait a finite amount of time with probability 1.
To solve DABC, we use a reduction to DRBC and a different agreement
protocol called external validity multi-valued Byzantine agreement or
MVBA. A protocol that solves MVBA allows each node Pi to dynamically
maintain a set values0i known as its valid inputs, and then come to consensus
on some value that everyone in the network considers a valid input. We assume
that these sets satisfy the following “reliability” and “validity” conditions:
• Assumed-Reliability: If Pk is strongly connected and any healthy node
Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k adds A to values
0
i , then eventually every unblocked node
Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k adds A to values
0
j .
• Assumed-Validity: If Pk is strongly connected and any unblocked node
Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k adds A to values
0
i , then there is some unblocked node Pj ∈
UNL
∞
k such that for every S ∈ ESj , the majority of unblocked nodes in S
“suggested” A before beginning the protocol.
Assumed-Reliability is important for ensuring eventual termination.
Assumed-Validity is only actually needed in appendix C where we use it for
proving a result about the relative efficiency of our MVBA algorithm.
Formally, under the above assumptions, an MVBA protocol is a protocol
that allows nodes to output some value according to the following properties:
• MVBA-Consistency: No two honest, linked nodes can output different
values.
• MVBA-Termination: If Pk is strongly connected, values
0
i has bounded
size for every unblocked node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k , and eventually some value A
is in values0i for every unblocked node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k ; then eventually every
unblocked node in UNL∞k terminates with probability 1.
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• MVBA-Validity: If Pi outputs A, then A ∈ values
0
i .
Note that our definition of MVBA is fairly different from that of Cachin
et al. [8]. Cachin et al. don’t assume any sort of reliability for their valid
input sets, and instead use cryptographic proofs to guarantee that any honest
node’s input can be verified as valid by everyone else. Our different definition
is necessitated by the lack of sufficiently expressive cryptographic proofs in our
domain. In the complete network model, a protocol that satisfies our definition
can trivially be applied in place of a protocol satisfying Cachin et al.’s definition,
simply by specifying an honest node Pi adds a value A to values
0
i if it receives a
valid proof for A’s validity. This might not satisfy Assumed-Validity, but since
Assumed-Validity is only needed for efficiency this is not a huge issue, and for
most use cases of MVBA it will satisfy Assumed-Validity.
The idea behind the reduction of DABC to MVBA is that each proposer
uses DRBC to broadcast their amendment A along with a slot number nA
that identifies where in the total ordering of amendments A is intended to be
ratified. Then for each slot number n, a node waits until it has ratified an
amendment with every earlier slot number and then supports A if and only if
it supports A in the context of the amendments ratified before slot nA. The
nodes begin an MVBA instance tagged with nA, and Pi sets values
0
i to be
the set of all the amendments with slot number n that Pi accepts through
DRBC, and ratifies whichever amendment is eventually output from MVBA.
Assumed-Reliability for the valid inputs holds immediately by RBC-Reliability,
and Assumed-Validity holds if “suggesting” refers to the act of supporting in
DRBC. The actual reduction requires a slight extension to guarantee Full-
Knowledge. The full reduction is described formally in section 4.5.1.
An alternative to specifying the slot number would be to include the hash
of the most recently ratified amendment proposal in each amendment proposal.
This would satisfy all the same properties, but may be more intuitive com-
ing from the “blockchain cannon”. It also could make it easier to tell when
the system has broken (since nodes that disagree with you will have different
hashes for the previous amendment) which could help nodes to panic and halt
everything until the system can be fixed rather than simply charging ahead and
possibly increasing the amount of damage that needs to be repaired. We use
the slot-based definition in this paper since it’s notationally simpler, and leave
the choice of which definition to actually use up to the implementors.
4.4.2 Multi-Valued Agreement
We now present our protocol for solving MVBA. To the author’s knowledge,
this protocol is not derived from any other complete network protocol. It relies
upon a reduction of MVBA to ABBA.
Similar to the ABBA protocol from section 4.3.2, the MVBA protocol pro-
ceeds in rounds. The protocol uses a sequence of CRS instances to give a “ran-
dom index” to the values for each round. Specifically, we assume the existence
of a collision resistant hash function H in the random oracle model [4]. In other
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words, for every x, H(x) is modeled as a true random variable drawn uniformly
from the image ofH , which can only be derived by explicitly asking an imagined
oracle to apply H to a chosen input x. Let S be a uniform probability space
over a set of size which is super-polynomial in the security parameter. For every
r > 0, let ρr be a CRS defined over S. Then if sr is the value received from
ρr, we define the functions Ir by Ir(A) = H(A||sr). By the assumption that
S is uniform over a super-polynomial set and the CRS-Randomness property,
the adversary can only produce sr in advance with negligible probability. Thus
for any A the adversary can only produce A||sr with negligible probability, so
until some healthy node samples ρ, with overwhelming probability Ir(A) is a
sequence of independent, uniformly sampled random variables for every r > 0.
It is worth noting that unlike the ABBA protocol, the randomness of the
CRS ρr is not needed to guarantee termination. As long as H is collision
resistant, then even if the random values are known in advance there is no way
for the network adversary to make the protocol continue for an infinite number of
rounds. However, without the randomness of ρr, termination can take a number
of rounds linear in the number of valid inputs, whereas with the randomness
assumption termination only takes at most an expected logarithmic number of
rounds. We prove this in section C.
To run MVBA, the node Pi runs the following protocol.
1. Set valuesri = ∅ for all r > 0, and set r = 0.
2. Wait until valuesri contains some value A, then broadcast ELECT (A, r)
if we have not yet broadcast ELECT ( , r).
3. For every essential subset S, wait until there exists some subset T ⊆ S,
such that |T | > qS , we received ELECT ( , r) from every node in T , and
if any node in T sent us ELECT (A′, r) for some A′, then A′ ∈ valuesri .
After waiting, if valuesri = {A} for some value A, broadcast
FINISH(A, r). Otherwise broadcast CONT (valuesri , r).
4. Upon receiving strong support for FINISH(A, r), vote 1 in an
ABBA instance tagged with (“STOP”, r). Otherwise, upon receiving
CONT (C, r) from any node where |C| > 2 and C ⊆ valuesri , broadcast
CONT (valuesri , r) and then vote 0 in the ABBA instance tagged with
(“STOP”, r).
5. Wait until the ABBA instance tagged with (“STOP”, r) terminates. If it
terminates on 1, wait until we receive weak support for FINISH(A, r)
for some value A, then broadcast FINISH(A, r) if we haven’t already
broadcast FINISH( , r); then wait until we receive strong support for
FINISH(A, r) where A ∈ values0i , and then finally output A and termi-
nate.
Otherwise if the ABBA instance terminates on 0, wait until we receive
CONT (C, r) from some node, where |C| > 2 and C ⊆ valuesri . Then
broadcast CONT (valuesri , r); further, if values
r
i later grows then each time
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broadcast CONT (valuesri , r) with the updated set. For every essential
subset S, wait until there exists some set C ⊆ valuesri such that we’ve
received strong support for CONT (C, r), then query the random oracle
ρr for sr, set est
r+1
i to the value in values
r
i with minimum Ir index, and
broadcast INIT (estr+1i , r + 1).
6. Upon receiving weak support for INIT (A, r+1) for an arbitrary value A,
or upon adding A to valuesri for some value A such that Ir(A) < Ir(est
r
i ),
broadcast INIT (A, r + 1) if we have not already done so.
7. Upon receiving strong support for INIT (A, r+1), add A to valuesr+1i , set
r = r + 1, and return to step 2 if we have not yet done so in this round.
The above protocol is again defined asynchronously, so that once you get to
some step in the protocol you keep running that step forever. This is important
since for example you might need to add more values to valuesri than simply the
first one that you add before jumping back to step 2.
One easy optimization is to begin broadcasting messages for round r + 1
without waiting for the round r ABBA to terminate. As long as we follow
the termination procedure for the first round in which ABBA terminates on
1, this can cut down the latency by a significant fraction without affecting the
correctness of the protocol.
4.4.3 Analysis
We will first prove the correctness of the MVBA algorithm, and then at the end
we will prove the correctness of our reduction from DABC to MVBA.
The following proposition shows that consistency is a local property. Thus,
although forward progress may depend on the configuration of other nodes in
the network, a node can at least guarantee that the amendments it observes are
consistent with the rest of the network as long as it alone is well configured.
Proposition 25. If two honest nodes Pi,Pj are linked, then if Pi outputs A,
Pj cannot output any A′ 6= A.
Proof. Suppose Pi outputs A. Then there must be some round r where Pi saw
that ABBA instance tagged with (“STOP”, r) terminate with 1, the ABBA
instances tagged with (“STOP”, r′) for every r′ < r terminate with 0, and Pi
received strong support for FINISH(A, r). By proposition 11, Pj cannot see
different ABBA outputs, so if Pj outputs A′ it must do so due to receiving
strong support for FINISH(A′, r). Since honest nodes can only broadcast a
single FINISH( , r) message, by lemma 2, A′ = A.
We now develop a few lemmas before we can prove the stronger consensus-
properties of MVBA.
Lemma 26. If Pk is strongly connected and any healthy node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k
adds A to valuesri for some r > 0, then every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k will
eventually add A to valuesrj .
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Proof. For r = 0 this follows by Assumed-Reliability. For r > 0, the proof is
identical to the proof of lemma 13.
For each r > 0 and each node Pi, let Sri be the set of all values that are
eventually added to valuesri .
Lemma 27. For any strongly connected node Pk, if S0i is finite for every
unblocked node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k , then for every r > 0 and every unblocked node
Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k , |S
r
j | > |S
r+1
j |.
Proof. Since Pk is strongly connected, for every healthy node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k and
every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k , S
r
i ⊆ S
r
j by lemma 26. Thus if a value A is
not in Srj , then no healthy node in UNL
∞
k will ever broadcast INIT (A, r + 1),
so Pj will never add A to values
r+1
j implying A /∈ S
r+1
j . Thus S
r+1
j ⊆ S
r
j , so to
show that |Srj | > |S
r+1
j | it suffices to show that there is some value in S
r
j that
is not in Sr+1j .
For a given r > 0, let Amax be the value with maximum Ir index in Srj .
By step 5 of the protocol, an honest node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k only sets est
r+1
i to some
value A if |valuesri | > 2 and A is the value with minimum Ir index in values
r
i .
But Srj ⊇ S
r
i ⊇ values
r
i , so if |values
r
i | > 2 then the value with minimum Ir
index in valuesri must have index strictly less than Amax (strictness comes from
collision resistance of H). Thus no honest node in UNL∞k will ever broadcast
INIT (Amax, r+1), so Pj can never add Amax to values
r+1
j , so Amax /∈ S
r+1
j .
Lemma 28. If Pk is strongly connected and every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k
gets to step 3 in round r > 0, then eventually either every unblocked node in
UNL
∞
k terminates in round r or every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k progresses to
round r + 1, with probability 1.
Proof. By assumption eventually every unblocked node in UNL∞k broadcasts
ELECT ( , r). Further, by lemma 26, if any unblocked node in UNL∞k broadcasts
ELECT (A, r) then eventually every unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k adds A to
values
r
j . Thus for any unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k , every unblocked node in
UNLj will eventually broadcast ELECT (A, r) for some A which is eventually
in valuesrj , allowing Pj to progress to step 4.
Since a healthy node only broadcasts FINISH(A, r) for some value A if
some healthy node in its UNL broadcast FINISH(A, r) first or it received
strong support for ELECT (A, r), by the same proof as in lemma 4 every healthy
node in UNL∞k that broadcasts a FINISH(A, r) message does so for a common
value A.
Since every unblocked node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k gets to step 4 in round r by the first
paragraph, every unblocked node in UNL∞k either broadcasts FINISH(A, r)
for some common value A or CONT (valuesr, r) where |values
r
i | > 2. For a
given unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k , if every unblocked node in UNLj broadcasts
FINISH(A, r) then Pj eventually receives strong support for FINISH(A, r)
and votes 1 in the ABBA instance tagged with (“STOP”, r). Otherwise Pj
eventually receives some CONT (C, n, r) from some unblocked node Pi ∈ UNLj .
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Since Pi is healthy, C must have been a subset of values
r
i , so by lemma 26
eventually C ⊆ valuesrj , so Pj eventually sees the CONT message as valid and
votes 0 in the ABBA instance tagged with (“STOP”, r). Thus every unblocked
node in UNL∞k eventually votes in the ABBA instance, and by proposition 23,
the instance eventually terminates with probability 1.
Suppose the ABBA instance terminates on 1. Then by proposition 22, there
must have been some unblocked node in UNL∞k that voted 1 and thus received
strong support for FINISH(A, r). But if any unblocked node in UNL∞k receives
strong support for FINISH(A, r) then by a similar proof as in proposition 5,
eventually every other unblocked node in UNL∞k will receive strong support
for FINISH(A, r). Since an honest node Pi only broadcasts FINISH(A, r)
if A ∈ valuesri ⊆ values
0
i , by lemma 26 eventually every unblocked node in
UNL
∞
k adds A as a valid input. Thus after seeing that the ABBA instance
tagged (“STOP”, r) terminated on 1, eventually every unblocked node in UNL∞k
outputs A in round r and terminates.
If on the other hand the ABBA instance terminates on 0, then by propo-
sition 22, for every unblocked node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k there is a chain of unblocked
nodes Pi = Pi0 , ...,Pin where Pik ∈ UNLik−1 for all k 6 n and Pin voted 0.
But a healthy and correct node Pin only votes 0 in the (“STOP”, r) ABBA
instance if it has broadcast a CONT message which by lemma 26, eventually
every unblocked node in UNL∞k can recognize as valid. Thus this CONT mes-
sage can be passed back along the chain until it reaches Pi, who eventually sees
it as valid. By lemma 26, eventually there is some set S such that for every
unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k , values
r
j = S, so eventually Pi will receive strong
support for CONT (S, r) and proceed to step 6.
Let Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k be unblocked and let Amin be the value with minimum
Ir index in Srj . For every unblocked node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k , since Pi sets est
r+1
i
by hypothesis and Srj = S
r
i by lemma 26, we have Ir(Amin) 6 Ir(est
r+1
i ) so
Pi eventually adds Amin to values
r
i . Thus eventually every unblocked node
in UNL∞k broadcasts INIT (Amin, r + 1), so eventually Pj can add Amin to
values
r+1
j and progress to round r + 1.
Proposition 29. If Pk is strongly connected and for every unblocked node Pi ∈
UNL
∞
k values
0
i is bounded in size and eventually nonempty, then eventually every
unblocked node in UNL∞k outputs some value with probability 1.
Proof. By lemma 28, either every unblocked node in UNL∞k terminates in some
round r or for every r > 0 every unblocked node in UNL∞k eventually gets to
round r with probability 1.
Therefore, by lemma 27 and our assumption that values0i is bounded (i.e., S
0
i
is finite), eventually either every unblocked node in UNL∞k terminates or every
unblocked node in UNL∞k gets to some round r where |S
r
k| 6 1 with probability
1. If |Srk| < 1, then no honest node can ever progress past step 2, implying that
every unblocked node terminates (since otherwise there would be an r > 0 such
that no unblocked node in UNL∞k eventually gets to round r with probability
1).
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Thus, every unblocked node in UNL∞k gets to some round r where
|Srk| = 1 with probability 1. Letting S
r
k = {A}, every unblocked node is
guaranteed to broadcast ELECT (A, r), so every unblocked node broadcasts
FINISH(A, r), so every unblocked node votes 1 in the ABBA instance tagged
with (“STOP”, r), and finally every unblocked node terminates in round r and
ratifies A.
Theorem 30. The protocol defined in section 4.4.2 satisfies the properties of
an external validity multi-valued Byzantine agreement algorithm in the open
network model.
Proof. Consistency is proven in proposition 25. Termination is proven in propo-
sition 29.
Validity follows trivially from the fact that in step 5 we only accept the value
A if it is included in values0i .
4.5 Reducing DABC to MVBA
4.5.1 Protocol
Having developed our MVBA protocol, all that remains is to formalize our
reduction of DABC to MVBA and prove its correctness. We begin first though
with an intuitive discussion that helps to better understand our choice for how
we guarantee Full-Knowledge for Cobalt.
As stated in section 4.4.1, the basic idea of our reduction is to have the pro-
posers distribute their amendment proposals using DRBC, and then use MVBA
to agree on a single amendment for each slot. An obvious first option for agree-
ing on the activation time for an amendment A is to include the activation time
as part of the proposal for A. This easily guarantees agreement on activation
times by the Agreement property of DRBC.
Unfortunately, there’s no way to make such a system satisfy both Liveness
and Full-Knowledge. For Full-Knowledge, nodes need to agree at some point
after time τ on which amendments might be ratified with activation times earlier
than τ . If the proposal for A specifies that A must have activation time τ , then
the network adversary can thus just wait until the honest nodes have decided
on which amendment could be ratified before time τ , and then deliver A to the
honest nodes only after that point. Since no honest nodes knew about A in time,
there is then no way for A to be ratified. Thus Liveness can’t be guaranteed,
since every amendment can be withheld long enough to cancel its validity.
Because of this problem, rather than requiring amendments to come pack-
aged with an activation time, it becomes necessary to be able to agree cooper-
atively on an activation time for A after A is received by the network. We now
formally describe how we do this.
First, we assume there is some implementation-defined parameter τint that
defines some interval duration. Making this parameter longer reduces contention
going into consensus (which can speed up termination) and decreases network
congestion, but making it too long can mean that you force you to wait longer
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before accepting (which can slow down termination). Thus finding a good bal-
ance is important for optimal performance. In practice, setting τint to around
15 seconds should give better performance than would be needed for any rea-
sonable level of required urgency, while avoiding an unreasonable level of added
network congestion.
We consider for every natural number n, there is a unique instance of MVBA
that is designated for slot n. A proposer that wants to propose the amendment A
for slot nA runs DRBC to broadcast the message (A, nA). A node Pi supports
this message in DRBC only if Pi has ratified an amendment for every slot
below nA, and Pi supports A in the context of all of these previously ratified
amendments.
Let P be a set that starts out empty. Upon accepting DRBC for (A, nA), Pi
adds (A, nA) to P . For every time τ which is a multiple of τint, upon arriving
at time τ , Pi runs the following protocol:
1. Broadcast CHECK(P, τ).
2. For a given pair (A, nA), once we have received a CHECK( , τ) message
that includes (A, nA) in its P set from qS nodes in every essential subset
S ∈ ESi, broadcast ACCEPT (A, nA, τ). We may broadcast multiple
ACCEPT messages if the condition is also satisfied at some point for a
different pair.
3. Upon receiving weak support for ACCEPT (A, nA, τ), broadcast
ACCEPT (A, nA, τ).
4. Upon receiving strong support for ACCEPT (A, nA, τ), add (A, τ) to
valid
0
i in the MVBA instance for slot nA, and remove any pairs from P
with slot nA (and don’t add any new pairs to P in the future that have
slot nA).
We call the combination of the DRBC instances with the above protocol
the stamping protocol. Effectively the stamping protocol just makes us con-
tinually try to pick out activation times for any supported amendment until
eventually we see enough ACCEPT messages that agree on the same times-
tamp so that we can use it for MVBA. Note that it is entirely possible with the
above protocol to have multiple valid inputs that pertain to the same amend-
ment and only differ in activation times. MVBA will choose a single activation
time that everyone agrees upon, so this does not cause any issues.
Now to check which amendments are ratified by time τ , we use a one-message
waiting protocol: wait until, for every time τ ′ 6 τ which is a multiple of τint
and for every essential subset S, there exists some subset Tτ ′ ⊆ S, such that
|Tτ ′| > qS , and from each node in Tτ ′ we received some message CHECK(P, τ ′)
(possibly with different sets P from different nodes) such that for every pair
(A, nA) ∈ P we’ve ratified some amendment for the slot nA.
Roughly speaking, the rationality behind these protocols is that if any
healthy node broadcasts a CHECK message for some amendment A, then we
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guarantee that some pair (A, nA, τ) will eventually be accepted in the stamp-
ing protocol by all unblocked nodes. Therefore every unblocked node eventu-
ally provides some input into MVBA for the slot nA, after which MVBA is
guaranteed to terminate in a finite amount of time with probability 1. This
prevents infinite waiting in the waiting protocol. On the other hand, if any
healthy node progresses past the waiting protocol for time τ without having
seen some amendment A, then we guarantee that there could not have been
enough CHECK( , τ) messages containing (A, nA) for any healthy node to
broadcast ACCEPT (A, nA, τ), so A cannot be accepted with timestamp τ by
any healthy node.
Note that the above protocol usually requires waiting a short amount of time
past τ for DABC to resolve before a node can learn all the amendments ratified
before time τ . A slight optimization would be to specify another duration
parameter τadv, and modify the protocol slightly so that an amendment that
is accepted as (A, nA, τ) actually has activation time τ + τadv, and the waiting
protocol for time τ only waits for τ ′ 6 τ − τadv. If τadv is set to the expected
maximum amount of time that DABC should take to ratify some slot after all
nodes provide input for that slot, then under normal conditions the waiting
protocol for time τ will already be finished by time τ .
4.5.2 Analysis
We now prove the correctness of the full DABC protocol.
Proposition 31. Outputs from the stamping protocol satisfy Assumed-
Reliability and Assumed-Validity, if suggesting (A, τ) is defined to be broad-
casting CHECK(P, τ) with (A, nA) ∈ P .
Proof. The mechanics of the ACCEPT message in modified DRBC are identical
to the mechanics of the READY message in RBC, so the proof of Assumed-
Reliability is the same as proposition 5.
For Assumed-Validity, suppose Pk is strongly connected and an unblocked
node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k adds (A, τ) to values
0
i . Then some unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k
must have broadcast ACCEPT (A, nA, τ), which it can only do having received
messages suggesting (A, τ) from qS nodes in every essential subset S ∈ ESj . But
for any node that broadcasts CHECK(P, τ) after beginning MVBA for slot nA,
the stamping protocol necessitates that no pair in P can have slot nA. Thus
qS nodes in every essential subset S ∈ ESj suggested (A, τ) before beginning
MVBA for slot nA, from which Assumed-Validity follows from equation 2.
The following two lemmas are key to how the modified algorithm satisfies
the Full Knowledge property.
Lemma 32. If Pk is strongly connected and some healthy node in UNL
∞
k broad-
casts CHECK(P, t), then for every A ∈ P , eventually every unblocked node in
UNL
∞
k accepts modified DRBC for some pair (A, ).
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Proof. By proposition 31, if any healthy node in UNL∞k accepts modified DRBC
for some pair (A, t′) then eventually every unblocked node in UNL∞k accepts
modified DRBC for (A, t′). Thus it suffices to show that if some healthy node
in UNL∞k broadcasts CHECK(P, t), then for every A ∈ P , eventually some
healthy node in UNL∞k accepts modified DRBC for some pair (A, t
′) with t′ > t.
Note that if Pi is healthy and has not yet accepted some pair (A, ), then
Pi broadcasts CHECK(P, t) if and only if it would have accepted unmodi-
fied DRBC for every A ∈ P before time t. By proposition 5, if Pi broadcasts
CHECK(P, t) then for every A ∈ P either some unblocked node in UNL∞k ac-
cepts some pair (A, ) or eventually there is some t′ for which every unblocked
node in UNL∞k broadcasts some CHECK(P, t
′) with A ∈ P . Thus every un-
blocked node in UNL∞k broadcasts ACCEPT (A, t
′), so eventually every un-
blocked node in UNL∞k accepts (A, t
′).
Lemma 33. If Pk is healthy and weakly connected and receives strong support
for CHECK( , t), then for any amendment A that is not present in any of the
received CHECK( , t) messages, no Pk will never ever accept modified DRBC
for (A, t).
Proof. The proof of this is more or less the same as the proof of lemma 2.
Suppose a healthy node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k accepts modified DRBC for (A, t). Then
there must have been qS nodes in every essential subset S ∈ ESi which broadcast
some CHECK( , t) message including A. Since Pk is weakly connected, it is
in particular fully linked to Pi, so there is some S ∈ ESk in which at least
qS− tS > tS+1 correct nodes broadcast some CHECK( , t) message including
A and qS > nS − tS . Since honest nodes only broadcast a single CHECK
message for each timestamp, Pk thus can receive at most nS − (tS + 1) < qS
CHECK( , t) messages from nodes in S that do not include A.
Lemma 34. If Pk is strongly connected and any healthy node in UNL
∞
k broad-
casts CHECK(P, τ) with some pair (A, nA) ∈ P , then eventually every un-
blocked node in UNL∞k ratifies some pair (A
′, τ ′) for slot nA.
Proof. By DRBC-Reliability, if a healthy node in UNL∞k broadcasts
CHECK(P, τ) with (A, nA) ∈ P , then eventually either some unblocked node
in UNL∞k receives strong support for ACCEPT (A, nA, τ
′) for some τ ′ or even-
tually every unblocked node broadcasts CHECK( , τ ′) for some τ ′ and with a
P -set containing (A, nA). In the former case every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k
eventually adds (A, τ ′) as a valid input for MVBA on slot nA by Assumed-
Reliability; in the latter case the same is clearly true.
Since honest nodes stop suggesting new amendments with slot number nA
after they accept their first amendment through DRBC for an amendment with
slot number nA, if eventually every unblocked node in UNL
∞
k accepts a valid
input for slot number nA, then every unblocked node can only accept a finite
number of valid inputs for slot number n; indeed, an unblocked node in UNL∞k
can only accept a valid input if it some unblocked node in UNL∞k suggested it,
but since a node clearly cannot suggest an infinite number of amendments in
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a finite amount of time, only a finite number of amendments with slot number
nA are supported by any unblocked node in UNL
∞
k .
Thus eventually every unblocked node in UNL∞k eventually sees a common
value (A, τ ′) as a valid input for MVBA on slot nA, and the number of valid in-
puts for any unblocked node in UNL∞k is bounded. Thus by MVBA-Termination,
every unblocked node in UNL∞k terminates MVBA with probability 1.
Proposition 35. If Pk is strongly connected and unblocked, and runs the wait-
ing protocol for any time τ , then eventually the waiting protocol terminates.
Proof. Once Pi has received all of the CHECK( , t′) messages from every un-
blocked node in UNLk for every t
′ 6 t, then for any amendment A included in
one of these CHECK messages, by lemma 32 eventually every unblocked node
in UNL∞k accepts modified DRBC for some pair (A, ). Thus by lemma 34, Pi
eventually ratifies some amendment for slot nA.
Proposition 36. If Pk is healthy and weakly connected and eventually ratifies
some amendment A with activation time t, then Pk will wait until it has ratified
A before completing the waiting protocol for any time t′ > t.
Proof. By lemma 33, if Pk eventually ratifies A with activation time t then Pk
cannot receive CHECK( , t) from qS nodes in every essential subset S ∈ ESk
such that A that is not present in any of the received CHECK( , t) messages.
Thus in the waiting protocol for time t′, Pk will wait until it has ratified some
amendment for slot nA, and we ratify A for slot nA by hypothesis.
Theorem 37. The modified DABC protocol defined in section 4.5.1 satisfies
the properties of a democratic atomic broadcast algorithm in the open network
model, along with the additional Full Knowledge property.
Proof. Linearizability follows directly fromMVBA-Consistency. Democracy fol-
lows immediately from MVBA-Validity and the corresponding Democracy prop-
erty of DRBC.
Liveness follows from DRBC-Censorship-Resilience and lemma 34. Democ-
racy follows from DRBC-Democracy and MVBA-Validity.
Agreement follows because a healthy node only outputs (A, τ) if it received
enough ACCEPT (A, nA, τ) messages to guarantee that every unblocked node
in UNL∞k adds (A, τ) to its valid inputs for MVBA on slot nA, in which case
every unblocked node in UNL∞k terminates MVBA with probability 1, and must
in fact output A by MVBA-Consistency.
Full Knowledge follows from proposition 35 and proposition 36.
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A Ordering Transactions
The discussion of Cobalt up until this point has been kept fairly general and
detached from any specific use-case. However, Cobalt is intended to be used for
XRP, which has a very specific use-case: the XRP Ledger is first and foremost a
system for generating a public log of transactions. Thus it would be somewhat
strange to not discuss how Cobalt relates to transaction processing.
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The primary goal of a decentralized transaction processing system is to de-
termine which transactions did or did not occur. Since transactions are signed
and universal constraints like “an empty account cannot send payments” govern
validity, if all nodes in the network can agree on a total ordering for the trans-
actions then every node can independently “apply” transactions in that order,
generate consistent ledgers at every step, and agree on which transactions were
valid by the universality of the constraints. Thus we consider a “transaction
processing” mechanism to be simply some mechanism which allows all nodes in
the network to agree on the order in which transactions should be applied.
Since Cobalt is in particular a form of atomic broadcast algorithm, it can
be directly applied to ordering transactions by sending transactions as amend-
ments that are supported automatically if they’re valid. For efficiency’s sake
it would be best to remove the activation time extension for this purpose, as
it adds significant weight and there’s no need to agree on activation times for
transactions; instead a node can just add a block as a valid input for MVBA
after accepting DRBC (or just regular RBC) for it. Even with the removal
of activation times, this would be horribly inefficient though, since only a sin-
gle transaction is accepted per MVBA instance. Further, a client with very fast
network connections could censor other clients’ transactions by submitting their
transaction for every slot first.
An alternative is to use the “blockchain model” and batch transactions into
blocks and submit the blocks as amendments. This is much less inefficient, but
still less than optimal: if P is the number of proposers and D is the sum of ni
across all nodes Pi, the latency per block would likely be at least several seconds
and grow logarithmically with P (see appendix C), while the communication
complexity would be O(D·P ) – which is probablyO(n3) asymptotically – placing
a relatively low limit on the possible throughput. Nonetheless, as described at
the end of this section, this mechanism is effective enough to be used as a
backup in emergencies, and has the benefit of being fully asynchronous unlike
the alternative we present.
For these reasons, rather than having every node in the decentralized network
participate in the agreement protocol for deciding the order of transactions, we
recommend instead using Cobalt to vote on a universally agreed-upon set of
nodes that run some fast and robust complete-network consensus algorithm like
Honeybadger [21] or Aardvark [13] to decide on the order of transactions. In
the sequel, to avoid confusion we refer to the network of nodes running Cobalt
as the Cobalt network, and the network of nodes agreeing on transactions the
transaction network. Changes to the transaction network are agreed upon
as amendments by the Cobalt network. To ensure that nodes in the transaction
network know about amendments by their activation time, we assume that
nodes in the transaction network are also nodes in the Cobalt network, so that
every correct node in the transaction network can reap the benefits of the full
knowledge property of Cobalt. We assume that Cobalt nodes still individually
validate transactions they receive from the transaction network, and throw out
any transactions that are invalid, so that a malicious transaction network cannot
arbitrarily modify the ledger state in illegal ways.
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Clearly there is no way to guarantee forward progress if every node in the
transaction network fails. However, we would like to at the very least ensure
that every correct node in the Cobalt network agrees on the transaction log
whenever the Cobalt network is safe, regardless of how many transaction nodes
fail. To make this work, rather than simply blindly accepting blocks from the
transaction network, we run a PBFT-like protocol that uses the transaction
network as a distributed “leader” and guarantees consistency even when the
leader fails.
We assume that there is an infinite sequence of transaction networks (pos-
sibly not all disjoint, or possibly not even unique) which we denote by v1, v2, ...
in analogy with the “views” of PBFT. In practice Cobalt is used to agree on
the sequence of views in a lazy way: amendments are proposed to add new
views that can be switched to in the event that the current transaction network
seems to be failing. Theoretically the views could be agreed upon in real time
so that vn+1 is decided upon only after vn is observed to be failing. However,
designating several “backups” in advance greatly increases the resilience and
adaptability of the algorithm so that almost all issues can be detected using
automated metrics and resolved in a matter of seconds using purely machine
agreement.
Let v be the current view, and let t(v) be the threshold of tolerated faulty
nodes in v. Further let lock(v) be a boolean variable for each view that initializes
as false, and let min(v) be a positive integer constant (in the first view of all
time, min(v) = 0; for other views, min(v′) gets set as part of the view change
protocol further below).
Blocks are generated by the transaction network with increasing “sequence
numbers” describing where the block is supposed to sit in the totally ordered
blockchain. When the nodes in v have agreed on a block B with sequence nB,
they each broadcast INIT (B, nB) to the Cobalt network.
A node Pi runs the protocol below to decide when to accept blocks from the
transaction network. Note the similarity to the RBC protocol.
1. Do not broadcast any messages pertaining to a sequence number n unless
n > min(v) and until we have accepted a batch for every sequence n′ with
min(v) 6 n′ and n′ < n.
2. Upon receiving INIT (B, nB, v) from t(v) + 1 nodes in v, broadcast
ECHO(B, nB , v) if we have not already broadcast ECHO( , nB, v).
3. Upon receiving weak support for ECHO(B, nB , v), broadcast
ECHO(B, nB , v) if we have not already broadcast ECHO( , nB, v).
4. Upon receiving strong support for ECHO(B, nB , v), broadcast
READY (B, nB, v) if we have not already broadcast READY ( , nB, v).
5. Upon receiving weak support for READY (B, nB, v), broadcast
READY (B, nB, v) if we have not already broadcast READY ( , nB, v).
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6. Upon receiving strong support for READY (B, nB, v), broadcast
CHECK(B, nB, v) if lock(v) is false and we have not already broadcast
CHECK( , nB, v).
7. Upon receiving strong support for CHECK(B, nB, v), accept the batch
B for sequence nB.
Clearly this shares all the same properties as a normal RBC algorithm.
To ensure that during ordinary cases (when the transaction network is not
critically failing) forward progress is being made, we assume that every correct
Cobalt node opens a reliable authenticated channel allowing every transaction
node to broadcast to it. By RBC-Non-Triviality then, as long as the transaction
network is not critically failed every Cobalt node will eventually accept every
transaction batch processed by the transaction network.
By the properties of RBC, if any Cobalt node accepts some batch of transac-
tions, then every Cobalt node eventually accepts the same batch of transactions,
and two Cobalt nodes never accept inconsistent batches. Thus if any correct
node observes that some transaction occurred, then every other correct node
will observe that transaction occurred.
Combined with the fact that Cobalt nodes individually validate all transac-
tions, this implies that regardless of the state of the transaction network, every
correct Cobalt node is consistent and does not accept any invalid transactions,
so safety is reduced purely to the correct configuration of the Cobalt network.
This is a significant improvement over other algorithms that elect a transaction
network but which suffer from the fact that safety is weaker than the safety of
the election network.
To complete the protocol specification, nodes need a way to trigger a view
change and agree on what the most recently accepted batch of transactions
was so that these transactions are not overwritten in the next view. Our view
change protocol is somewhat different from that of PBFT due to the lack of
fully expressive cryptography in our setting.
To request a view change, Pi runs the following protocol.
1. Broadcast CHANGE(v′) where v′ is the next view.
2. Upon receiving strong support for CHANGE(v′), broadcast
CONFIRM(v′) if we have not already done so.
3. Upon receiving weak support for CONFIRM(v′), broadcast
CONFIRM(v′) if we have not already done so.
4. Upon receiving strong support for CONFIRM(v′), set lock(v) to true
and broadcast LOCK(v′, n), where n is the highest sequence number of
any batch we have accepted from v.
5. Wait until, for every essential subset S ∈ ESi, we have received
LOCK(v′, ) from every node in some subset T ⊆ S with |T | = qS , such
that if we received LOCK(v′, n) for any n and from any node in T , then
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we have received strong support for READY ( , n). Let nlocked be the
maximum sequence number present in any of the LOCK(v′, ) messages
we received from nodes in one of the T sets.
6. If Pi is a member of v′, then Pi runs an external validity MVBA
consensus mechanism to agree on a sequence number ncont which is
greater than nlocked but for which we have received strong support
for READY (B, ncont − 1, v) for some batch B. Pi then broadcasts
NEWV IEW (v′, ncont).
7. Upon receiving NEWV IEW (v′, ncont) from t(v
′) + 1 nodes in v′,
if ncont is greater than nlocked and we have received strong sup-
port for READY (B, ncont − 1, v) for some batch B, then broadcast
ECHO(v′, ncont) if we have not already broadcast ECHO(v
′, ).
8. Upon receiving weak support for ECHO(v′, ncont), broadcast
ECHO(v′, ncont) if we have not already broadcast ECHO(v
′, ).
9. Upon receiving strong support for ECHO(v′, ncont), broadcast
READY (v′, ncont) if we have not already broadcast READY (v
′, ).
10. Upon receiving weak support for READY (v′, ncont), broadcast
READY (v′, ncont) if we have not already broadcast READY (v
′, ).
11. Upon receiving strong support for READY (v′, ncont), for every n < ncont
wait until we’ve received strong support for READY (B, n, v) for some
batch B, then accept B as the batch with sequence n. Finally, switch the
view to v′ and set min(v′) = ncont.
We omit the proofs that the above protocol is correct. It is very similar
to the proofs of Full Knowledge in section 4.5.2. Note that nodes can request
a view change again even before receiving a NEWV IEW message, which is
necessary in the event that the v′ network starts out failed. The view change
protocol can be optimized slightly further, but considering that we expect it
to be rarely invoked, we opt for the less optimized protocol since we feel it is
clearer.
One remaining issue with the above protocol is that if all of the planned
backup views fail simultaneously, then the network can be shut down for an
extended period of time until human node operators can agree on a new set
of transaction nodes and ratify the amendment for it. Since the Cobalt nodes
cannot distinguish node failure from communication failure, this opens a path
for effectively attacking the network: launch a temporary IP routing attack
against the backup views that lasts just long enough to make the Cobalt nodes
panic. If the attack can last for a minute or two (just long enough to run through
all of the backup views) then even after the attacker stops being active, it could
take hours to restore the network.
In situations like this where we run out of backup views, we thus resort to
using Cobalt to order transactions; since the alternative is total network halting,
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the inefficiency of Cobalt is acceptable here. The Cobalt transaction blocks are
run in parallel on a separate chain from the amendments, since there’s no need
to order them relative to each other and doing so would harm performance.
Further, Cobalt is run without activation times for agreeing on transaction
blocks, since there’s no need.
As it stands, Cobalt is not at all censorship resilient: a well-connected mali-
cious node can always force its own blocks to be the ones included. We thus need
to make one more small change to prevent censorship. Rather than including
the slot number as part of the information in a transaction block proposal, each
block is acceptable anywhere in the chain. Once a node sees a certain block
B as a valid input, it continues considering it as valid for all future slots, and
it refuses to support any other blocks even for future slots until B is ratified
for some slot. This guarantees that every single block proposed will eventually
be included in the chain, which trivially prevents censorship. Unlike amend-
ments, there is no danger in allowing blocks to be placed at an indeterministic
location in the chain, since the validity of each transaction can be checked ex-
ternally. However, the performance is clearly very poor when the blocks have
high overlap, which is why we refrain from using this mechanism in the ordinary
case.
B Implementing Cryptographic Randomness
In section 4.1 we defined the properties of a common random source protocol.
Here we describe how such a protocol can be implemented in the open network
model.
To begin, suppose there is some value s that can only be constructed by the
adversary with negligible probability. For a given probability space S, let G
be some cryptographic pseudorandom generator that is modeled as a random
oracle that samples S [4]. Then by definition of a random oracle, G(s) is a true
random value until the adversary can construct s, which we assumed can only
occur with negligible probability.
Cachin et al. construct a CRS in the complete network model by a reduction
to a robust (t + 1, n)-threshold signature scheme [10]. A robust (t + 1, n)-
threshold signature scheme is a protocol where a group of n nodes has “shares”
of some secret key s, and can collaborate to produce a signature σ(M) over a
given messageM using s. We require that if all the unblocked nodes in the group
try to sign a given message then they can eventually produce the signature, and
further a computationally bounded adversary controlling up to t nodes in the
group with overwhelming probability cannot construct σ(M) until at least one
honest node in the group has tried to sign M . Thus if M is a proactively
agreed upon unique tag for the CRS instance, then letting the output of CRS
be G(σ(M)) immediately gives a protocol that satisfies the required properties.
It is not immediately clear how to adapt this scheme to the essential subset
model, where the notion of a “threshold” is undefined. Our adaptation centers
around taking a single secret s and distributing it as a threshold secret among
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S for multiple essential subsets S. Thus any single such subset can reconstruct
s on its own. A naive implementation of this would be insecure though, since a
single poorly configured essential subset could leak the secret. Ideally, the only
assumption that Pi should need to make is that the essential subsets in ESi are
all well-configured, since otherwise Pi can’t guarantee termination regardless.
To enable every node to verify locally that the secret cannot be leaked to the
adversary, we suppose informally that there exists a way of combining several
values such that if any single value is secret then the output is also secret. For
example, concatenating the values and running them through a random oracle
would suffice. We call such a function a mixer.
Now suppose Pi has some secret s with a corresponding public key p. We use
an asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) scheme. An AVSS protocol
allows a specified dealer to distribute shares of a secret s between a set of nodes
in a way that an honest node which terminates can guarantee with overwhelm-
ing probability that shares of the actual secret corresponding to p has been
distributed to all the honest nodes in the group, even if the dealer is Byzantine.
For example, the scheme presented by Cachin et al. would work without modifi-
cation [9]. Using such an AVSS scheme, Pi can distribute (tS+1, nS)-threshold
shares of s to every essential subset S ∈ ESi. As mentioned in section 2, Pi may
have to pay a fee or provide a proof-of-work in order to convince the nodes in
these sets to participate in its secret sharing protocols, but we assume that if
Pi is non-faulty and reasonably determined then it can successfully distribute
s.
Although the same s is distributed to each essential subset, we assume that
for any two essential subsets S, S′ ∈ ESi, and any two subsets T ⊆ S, T ′ ⊆ S′
with |T | 6 tS , |T ′| 6 tS′ , the shares of s in T are independent of the shares
of s in T ′. This can be achieved for example with Shamir’s threshold sharing
scheme [25] by generating a different polynomial pS(x) = s+cS,1x+...+cS,tSx
tS
for each essential subset S ∈ ESi, where the non-s coefficients are all uniformly
sampled and independent between essential subsets.
We introduce the notion of a pseudo-amendment as an amendment that
doesn’t have an actual “proposer”. Instead, some external mechanism allows
nodes to learn about the amendment details, and then they support it as usual
by broadcasting an ECHO message for it. After determining that AVSS suc-
ceeded, a node Pj in one of Pi’s essential subsets broadcasts a confirmation
ALLOW (p) where p is the public key corresponding to s. If a node receives weak
support for ALLOW (p), then it votes to support a Cobalt pseudo-amendment
that adds p to a common set of “randomizing keys”. Thus honest, weakly
connected nodes are guaranteed to have their randomizing key accepted by
DABC-Liveness (since adding randomization keys does not contradict any other
amendments, if a slot fails to add p then nodes can try again; we assume that the
technique mentioned at the end of appendix A for guaranteeing full Censorship-
Resilience is used so that p is eventually accepted).
The general idea is to create signatures over a message M corresponding to
each randomization key, and then mix them all together to create the seed for the
random function G. By the definition of mixing, adding an extra randomizing
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key cannot decrease the security of the overall protocol, since as long as the
secret a single randomizing key is secure then the result of mixing signatures is
also secure.
CRS-Agreement follows immediately from the DABC-Agreement and
DABC-Full-Knowledge properties of Cobalt. Indeed, for any given time τ , ev-
ery node agrees on the set of amendments activated before τ , so every node
agrees on the same set of randomizing keys. Since any node can verify a signa-
ture locally, every node that outputs a signature over the specified tag M for
every randomizing key must output the exact same set of signatures, and thus
produces the same result for CRS.
CRS-Termination follows by DABC-Democracy and the assumed robust-
ness of the threshold signature scheme. Because of the way we use ALLOW
messages, DABC-Democracy only guarantees that for any weakly connected un-
blocked node Pi and any randomizing key p, there is some unblocked node in
UNLi that can receive shares of the signature corresponding to p from one of its
essential subsets. Thus we assume that nodes that receive shares of σ(M) echo
the message after they have successfully reconstructed it. Since Pi can verify
the authenticity of σ(M) locally, this does not hamper safety and allows Pi to
eventually produce an output.
CRS-Randomness is simply by reduction to the security of the threshold sig-
nature scheme. We can assume that Pi has distributed its secret and successfully
planted a public key p among the randomization keys (which requires only that
Pi was at one point correct and weakly connected). Then by the definition
of mixing, the output of CRS cannot be predicted until the signature over M
corresponding to p is known. By threshold security and our assumptions about
ESi, this cannot occur until some honest node in one of Pi’s essential subsets has
revealed its signature share over M corresponding to p. Thus by modeling G
as a random oracle, we have that with overwhelming probability the adversary
cannot distinguish in advance a true random variable sampled over S from the
output of CRS, since the output of CRS is by definition G applied to the mixed
signatures.
An unfortunate requirement of this system is that it requires consensus to
be running properly for new nodes to add their own randomization keys. Thus
if the adversary is ever able to compromise every single randomization key,
then theoretically the system may be unable to ever recover. It is unclear if it
is possible to construct an efficient CRS system in our network model that is
capable of recovering from total compromise. Nonetheless, in practice this is
unlikely to be an issue: assuming a decent initial setup, the likelihood of every
randomization key ever being simultaneously compromised is very low, and even
with foresight of the CRS output values, in practice it would be very difficult for
the adversary to prevent termination of Cobalt for an extended period of time,
so recovery even from total compromise should always be possible in practice.
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C Logarithmic Time MVBA
Although the results in section 4.4.3 fully prove correctness of the MVBA proto-
col, so far we have only shown that the number of rounds MVBA could theoret-
ically take is bounded by the number of valid inputs, which would imply rather
poor worst-case performance. The following proposition refines the performance
analysis and proves that for a large enough hash function H , the expected num-
ber of rounds is in fact at most logarithmic in the number of valid inputs. This
shows that Cobalt is actually reasonably efficient.
Proposition 38. Suppose H is a random oracle. For any strongly connected
node Pk, if Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k is unblocked, then if the image of H is large enough
the expected number of rounds after which MVBA terminates is at most c +
log3(|S
0
i |) +O(1/|S
0
i |) where c is a small constant c ≈ 0.
Proof. To show that MVBA is expected to terminate at or before the R-th
round, it suffices to show that the expected number of rounds until |Sri | = 0 is
at most R+1. We do this by showing that the random oracles force a constant
fraction of possible values to be cut out each round, and then compute the
expected value analytically.
First, suppose A ∈ S0i for any unblocked node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k . Then by
Assumed-Validity, there must be some unblocked node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k such that
for every S ∈ ESj the majority of nodes in S suggested A before beginning
MVBA. If Pi′ ∈ UNLi is healthy and sampled ρr for any r > 0, then because
Pi′ waits for enough CONT messages (which can only be sent by nodes that
have started MVBA) before sampling ρr, strong connectivity implies that some
honest node in UNL∞k must have begun MVBA before Pi′ sampled ρr and also
suggested A before beginning MVBA. Thus A must have been chosen before
Pi′ sampled ρr. By CRS-Randomness, if sr is the value returned by ρr, the
probability of the adversary being able to construct sr at the time of choosing
A is negligible. Thus with overwhelming probability, given any A,A′ ∈ S0i and
r, r′ > 0 with A 6= A′ and/or r 6= r′, Ir(A) and Ir′(A′) are independent uniform
random variables sampled from the image of the hash functions.
For any healthy node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k that gets past step 5 in round r, let
Ci ⊆ values
r
i be the set for which Pi saw strong support for CONT (Ci, r). If
Pi,Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k are both healthy and get past step 5 in round r, then, since Pk
is strongly connected by assumption, Pi and Pj are fully linked, so some honest
node must have sent both CONT (Ci, r) and CONT (Cj , r). But honest nodes
only send CONT messages for increasing subsets, so either Ci ⊆ Cj or Cj ⊆ Ci.
Thus by transitivity of set inclusion, there exists some healthy node Pi ∈
UNL
∞
k such that Ci ⊆ Cj for every other healthy node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k . In par-
ticular, there exist at least two values A1, A2 such that for every healthy node
Pj ∈ UNL
∞
k , A1 and A2 are contained in values
r
j before Pj samples ρr. Let L
be the size of the image of H , and, for simplicity of notation, suppose without
loss of generality that the image of H is {0, ..., L− 1}.
Let xr = min{Ir(A1), Ir(A2)}. Since A1 and A2 are both in values
r
i be-
fore any healthy node in UNL∞k queries the oracle ρr, this guarantees that
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Ir(est
r+1
i ) 6 xr by the mechanism for selecting est
r+1
i in step 5. Since a healthy
node Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k only broadcasts INIT (A, r+1) if Ir(A) 6 Ir(est
r+1
j ) for some
healthy node Pj ∈ UNL
∞
i ⊆ UNL
∞
k , this guarantees that if any healthy node
Pi ∈ UNL
∞
k adds A to values
r+1
i , then Ir(A) 6 xr. Since A1 and A2 are both in
values
r
i before any healthy node in UNL
∞
k queries the oracle ρr, these indices are
independent uniform random variables with overwhelming probability. There-
fore a simple computation gives us Pr[xr = k] = (2L− 2k− 1)/L2|+ ǫ(k) where
|ǫ(k)| is negligible for every k ∈ {0, ..., L− 1}.
Let Pr be the probability that a given value A ∈ S0i is also in S
r
i . Since a
value A is in Sri only if Hr′(A) 6 xr′ for every r
′ < r, the probability that a
given value in S0i is in S
r
i is at most
Pr 6 Pr[H0(A) 6 x0, H1(A) 6 x1, ..., Hr−1(A) 6 xr−1]
=
r−1∏
i=0
Pr[Hi(A) 6 xi].
Partitioning the sample space and summing over all possible values of xi
gives
Pr[Hi(A) 6 xi] =
L−1∑
k=0
k + 1
L
· Pr [xi = k]
=
L−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)(2L− 2k − 1)
L3
+
(k + 1)ǫ(k)
L
6
1
3
+
7
6L
+
1
L3
+ ǫ
for negligible ǫ. Define q = 1
3
+ 7
6L
+ 1
L3
+ ǫ. Thus Pr 6 q
r for all r > 0. We can
model this as a game where we start with |S0i | balls and proceed to throw them
into an urn with a q chance of each ball landing in the urn. We discard any
balls that fall out of the urn and repeat this process until the urn is empty, and
ask for the expected number of rounds this takes. This problem is investigated
by Szpankowski and Vernon [26] who prove the expected round R after which
the urn empties is
E[R] =
ln
(
|S0i |
)
+ γ
− ln (q)
+
1
2
+ εq +O
(
1
|S0i |
)
,
where γ ≈ 0.577 is Euler’s gamma constant and εq is a very small value,
experimentally found to be εq < 3 · 10−4 for q ≈ 1/3. Finally, expanding q
around L =∞ gives
E[R] 6
ln
(
|S0i |
)
+ γ
ln (3)
+
1
2
+ εq +O
(
1
|S0i |
)
+O
(
1
L
)
+ ǫ
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< log3
(
|S0i |
)
+ 1.03 +O
(
1
|S0i |
)
+O
(
1
L
)
+ ǫ.
The proposition follows by subtracting 1 from R to get the expected value
of the number of rounds r for which |Sri | is nonempty.
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